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INTRODUCTION 
On November 18, 2000, Ryan K. Schorr, a twenty-five-year-old who 
suffered from bipolar disorder, was involuntarily committed to the 
Holy Spirit Hospital in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, after his family and 
roommate noticed that his condition was deteriorating.1  Though 
Schorr was placed in a high security room at the hospital, when a crisis 
intervention worker opened his door to enter, he pushed past her and 
escaped confinement.2  After Schorr answered his family’s phone call 
to his apartment, his family informed the police of his whereabouts.3  
West Shore Regional Police Officers Harry Hart Jr. and Gary Berres-
ford arrived at Schorr’s apartment and, after knocking on the door 
and receiving no response, entered the residence through a partially 
open back door.4  The officers found Schorr in his bedroom, where a 
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1 Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne (Schorr I), 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 233 (M.D. Pa. 
2003); Kara McConnell, Judge Gives Green Light to Lawsuit, SENTINEL, Feb. 27, 2003, 
http://www.cumberlink.com/articles/2003/02/27/news/news03.prt. 
2 Schorr I, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 233. 
3 Id. 
4 Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne (Schorr II), 265 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490 (M.D. Pa. 
2003); McConnell, supra note 1. 
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violent confrontation ensued.5  Schorr shot at Berresford’s hand and 
Hart struck Schorr with a baton; eventually Schorr fled the room.6  
The officers called for backup, but before assistance arrived, Schorr, 
brandishing pots and pans, returned to the bedroom.7  Hart shot and 
killed him.8  Schorr’s parents brought an action in their own right and 
as representatives of their son’s estate against the police officers, the 
police commission, and the chief of police.9
The circumstances of Schorr’s death are, unfortunately, not 
unique.  There are a number of cases in which police officers, in at-
tempts to apprehend people with mental disabilities, have injured or 
killed them, even when the victim’s family or friend originally sum-
moned the officers to provide assistance.10  However, what distin-
guishes the Schorrs’ case from the majority of excessive force cases is 
that the Schorrs not only brought the usual claims for police miscon-
duct under Section 1983,11 but also sued the police commission under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)12 and the Rehabilitation 
Act.13  The Schorrs alleged that the police commission violated their 
5 Schorr II, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 490. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 See, e.g., Neuburger v. Thompson, 124 F. App’x 703, 704 (3d Cir. 2005) (discuss-
ing a woman’s shooting death by police who were called in an attempt to prevent her 
suicide); Clem v. Corbeau, 98 F. App’x 197, 199-200 (4th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (dis-
cussing an excessive force claim by a plaintiff whose wife called police when he would 
not eat or take his medication and who was subsequently shot three times by an offi-
cer); Thompson v. Williamson County, 219 F.3d 555, 556 (6th Cir. 2000) (providing 
the factual background of a case in which a mentally disabled man was shot and killed 
by police); see also Michael Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People:  Defining the 
Totality of Circumstances Relevant to Assessing the Police Use of Force Against Emotionally Dis-
turbed People, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 331 (2003) (“Sometimes . . . incidents 
[with mentally ill individuals] become confrontational and escalate to a violent conclu-
sion, ending with the serious injury or death of the disturbed person.”).  See generally 
Jennifer Fischer, Student Article, The Americans with Disabilities Act:  Correcting Discrimi-
nation of Persons with Mental Disabilities in the Arrest, Post-Arrest, and Pretrial Processes, 23 
LAW & INEQ. 157, 195 (2005) (“A lack of community-based treatment alternatives and 
law enforcement’s inability to appropriately respond to persons with a mental illness 
through appropriate policies and programs result in the unjustified institutionalization 
of persons with a mental illness in jails and prisons, and too often result in their 
deaths.”). 
11 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
12 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). 
13 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).  Claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act 
pertaining to police officers’ actions in effecting an arrest are similar in substance and 
are often treated by courts as interchangeable.  Therefore, references to the ADA 
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son’s right to be free from discrimination on the basis of disability by 
“failing to make reasonable modifications to [its] policies, practices 
and procedure to ensure that his needs as an individual with a disabil-
ity would be met,”14 in violation of Title II of the ADA.15  The court 
agreed that the Schorrs could state a claim under Title II,16 as well as 
under Section 1983.17
While the court’s decision in Schorr I was a significant step toward 
acceptance of the ADA’s application to law enforcement activities,18 it 
was not the first judicial opinion to espouse such a notion.  As early as 
1998, courts began laying the foundation for claims of police miscon-
duct under Title II.19  The United States Supreme Court has not yet 
ruled on the applicability of Title II to police actions in effecting an 
arrest,20 and historically the circuit courts have been split on the ques-
tion.21  However, in many jurisdictions plaintiffs can now bring ADA 
throughout this Comment should be read to include Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act.  See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the similarities and differences between the 
two actions. 
14 Schorr I, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 234 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
15 Title II provides:  “Subject to the provisions of this [title], no qualified individ-
ual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation 
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or 
be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”  42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). 
16 See Schorr I, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 239 (“[I]t is clear to this Court that Plaintiffs have 
stated a claim under the ADA.”). 
17 See id. at 234 (characterizing plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim as a Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process claim and denying defendants’ motion to dismiss 
on that count). 
18 See McConnell, supra note 1 (noting that Judge Kane, who presided over the 
Schorrs’ case, was “one of the first judges to recognize that how police respond to peo-
ple with disabilities depends on their training”). 
19 See Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1998) (broadly construing 
Title II’s phrase “programs, services, or activities” and holding that prisoners could fall 
within the category of “qualified individual[s] with a disability”); Gorman v. Bartch, 
152 F.3d 907, 913 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that a disabled arrestee’s claim against po-
lice officers fell within the ADA). 
20 For the purposes of this Comment, I will use the term “arrest” broadly to refer 
to any action by a police officer detaining or incarcerating an individual.  Accord Go-
hier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1220 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999) (“This opinion broadly uses 
the term ‘arrest’ to include several different scenarios:  arrests[,] investigations poten-
tially involving an arrest, . . . and violent confrontations not technically involving an 
arrest . . . .”). 
21 See Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that while 
Title II does not apply to police officers’ “on-the-street” responses to disturbances, 
once an area is secure and there is no threat to human safety, the officers must rea-
sonably accommodate a suspect’s disability); Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1221 (“[A] broad rule 
categorically excluding arrests from the scope of Title II . . . is not the law.”); Gorman, 
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claims pertaining to police misconduct and realistically believe that 
they have a chance for recovery.22
The growing possibility that disabled plaintiffs23 can bring claims 
for police misconduct under Title II has significant benefits for the 
practice of civil rights law in this country.  The traditional route for 
police misconduct lawsuits, Section 1983, presents many obstacles to 
success for both disabled plaintiffs24 and the general population.25  
Any alternative means of bringing a subset of civil rights cases—even 
one that is limited to a specific group of plaintiffs (disabled persons) 
and a specific type of claim (police misconduct)—should not be ig-
nored. 
This Comment will explore courts’ treatment of actions for police 
misconduct under Title II and the contours of the decisional law in 
that area.  Part I will discuss the theoretical bases for application of 
the ADA to arrests, namely the wrongful arrest theory and the reason-
able accommodation theory.  Part II will analyze the case law that has 
arisen out of plaintiffs’ attempts to bring claims for police misconduct 
under Title II.  Part II will also demonstrate how initial assumptions 
that lower courts made about the applicability of the ADA to such law-
suits—which prevented them from allowing the claims to go for-
152 F.3d at 912 (holding that plaintiff’s claims pertaining to police officers’ actions in 
transporting him to the police station after an arrest fit within the meaning of the 
ADA); Rosen v. Montgomery County, 121 F.3d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The most 
obvious problem is fitting an arrest into the ADA at all.”); see also McConnell, supra 
note 1 (noting that historically the circuit courts have been split on whether the ADA 
applies to police activities).  See generally Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 897-98 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (surveying cases pertaining to ADA application to police activities). 
22 See infra Part II.C (discussing recent cases ruling on claims of police misconduct 
under the ADA). 
23 This Comment will focus mainly on actions by individuals with mental or emo-
tional disabilities because they are frequently subject to interaction with the police.  See 
Avery, supra note 10, at 262-63 (“[I]n medium and large cities nationwide, police de-
partments estimate that an average of approximately seven percent of police calls in-
volve mentally ill people.”).  However, in analyzing the decisional law surrounding the 
ADA, I will also discuss cases involving plaintiffs who suffer from a variety of other dis-
abilities, including deafness, paraplegia, and physical difficulties resulting from a 
stroke.  The type of disability in an individual case is often relevant to the question of 
whether the police officers were aware of the plaintiff’s disability because individuals 
with mental and emotional disabilities may be less likely to inform the officers of their 
disability, and the disability itself may not be immediately apparent to the officer.  See 
infra note 173 for a discussion of the knowledge requirement under Title II. 
24 See Avery, supra note 10, at 265-66 (discussing mentally disabled plaintiffs’ diffi-
culties in proving claims against police officers under Section 1983). 
25 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors to Civil Rights Litigants, 5 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 538 (2003) (noting that the Rehnquist Court ruled against plain-
tiffs in the “overwhelming majority” of civil rights cases). 
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ward—were discredited by the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Corrections v. Yeskey,26 leaving the path clear for acceptance of 
Title II in the law enforcement context.  Part III addresses the ques-
tion of why a disabled plaintiff should bring ADA claims for civil rights 
violations when the traditional remedy is an action under Section 
1983.  Part III will also compare the obstacles to recovery under each 
claim and will attempt to determine under what circumstances an 
ADA claim might succeed even when a parallel Section 1983 action 
would likely fail.  In addition, Part III will describe the distinction be-
tween the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and the advantages and 
disadvantages of pleading a parallel claim under the Rehabilitation 
Act in addition to an ADA claim.  Finally, Part III will provide reasons, 
beyond strategic benefits, for disabled plaintiffs to plead claims in ad-
dition to the usual Section 1983 claims.  In conclusion, this Comment 
will bring together two strands of argument—the feasibility of ADA 
claims for police misconduct and the desirability of those actions over 
the traditional civil rights claims—to demonstrate that there are im-
portant practical and symbolic reasons for plaintiffs to plead their dis-
ability claims under the ADA. 
I.  THEORETICAL BASES FOR APPLYING THE ADA TO ARRESTS: 
WRONGFUL ARREST THEORY AND REASONABLE  
ACCOMMODATION THEORY 
Courts have developed two different theories under which a plain-
tiff may state an ADA claim based on police officers’ actions in effect-
ing an arrest.27  The “wrongful arrest theory” applies when police offi-
cers have “wrongly arrested someone with a disability because they 
misperceived the effects of that disability as criminal activity.”28  A 
claim under the “reasonable accommodation theory,” on the other 
26 524 U.S. 206 (1998). 
27 Although courts have analyzed ADA claims according to these theories for over 
ten years, it appears that no court had articulated the terms “wrongful arrest theory” 
and “reasonable accommodation theory” in reference to the analysis of an ADA claim 
pertaining to police officer action until Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 
1999).  See Jackson v. Inhabitants of Sanford, Civ. No. 94-12-P-H, 1994 WL 589617, at *6 
(D. Me. Sept. 23, 1994) (allowing the plaintiff’s claim to proceed because the ADA 
precludes discriminatory and “unjustified arrests” of disabled persons, but not specifi-
cally applying the wrongful arrest theory); see also Anthony v. City of New York, No. 00 
Civ. 4688(DLC), 2001 WL 741743, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2001) (citing Jackson and 
other ADA cases from the 1990s as illustrations of the wrongful arrest theory and the 
reasonable accommodation theory), aff’d, 339 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2003). 
28 Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1220. 
    
162 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 157 
 
hand, posits that even though police officers properly investigated and 
arrested a person with a disability, they “failed to reasonably accom-
modate the person’s disability in the course of investigation or arrest, 
causing the person to suffer greater injury or indignity in that process 
than other arrestees.”29  In addition, there are cases that fall in be-
tween the two theories, to which courts have generally declined to ap-
ply Title II.30
A.  Wrongful Arrest Theory 
A plaintiff has a valid claim under the wrongful arrest theory if po-
lice officers have arrested her because of lawful actions that she has 
taken as result of her disability.  The paradigm case illustrating this 
theory is Lewis v. Truitt.31  In Lewis, three police officers went to plain-
tiff Charles Lewis’s home in order to take his granddaughter to police 
headquarters to resolve a custody dispute.32  The officers attempted to 
speak with Lewis, even though other people present at the house had 
told the officers that Lewis was deaf and that the best way to commu-
nicate with him was by writing questions down on a piece of paper.33  
The officers proceeded to enter the plaintiff’s home and “physically 
assault[]” him, causing “bruises, contusions, and severe internal inju-
ries.”34  They eventually arrested him and charged him with resisting 
law enforcement.35  Lewis filed an action against the officers and the 
city under the ADA, and the court partially denied defendants’ mo-
tion for summary judgment on the claim, stating that “a genuine issue 
of material fact exists on the question of whether Defendants arrested 
Plaintiff because of his disability.”36
Courts have similarly allowed ADA claims to go forward based on 
allegations of wrongful arrest as the result of other disabilities.  In 
Jackson v. Inhabitants of Sanford, plaintiff Roland Jackson argued that 
29 Id. at 1220-21. 
30 See, e.g., id. at 1221 (affirming summary judgment on the ADA claim because 
the case was “logically intermediate between” the wrongful arrest theory and the rea-
sonable accommodation theory). 
31 960 F. Supp. 175 (S.D. Ind. 1997). 
32 Id. at 176. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 177. 
36 Id. at 179 (emphasis added).  The case was settled a month after the court’s rul-
ing on summary judgment.  Docket at entry 51, Lewis v. Truitt, No. IP96-C-0411-H/G 
(S.D. Ind. Apr. 22, 1997) (PACER). 
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he was arrested because of symptoms that he suffered after a stroke 
and that the Town of Sanford had failed to train its police officers to 
recognize such symptoms and to modify its policies, practices, and 
procedures to prevent discriminatory treatment of the disabled.37  
Jackson had been arrested for driving under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor and/or drugs after a police officer noticed that he was 
“unsteady on his feet, swayed noticeably, slurred his speech, and ap-
peared confused.”38  Even though Jackson informed the officer that 
he was not drunk and that he had suffered a brain aneurysm that left 
him with physical difficulties, the officer insisted that Jackson perform 
sobriety tests.39  After Jackson could not satisfactorily complete the 
tests due to his physical disabilities, the officer arrested him.40  The 
court denied the town’s motion for summary judgment on the ADA 
claims.41
Although few judges have specifically recognized the existence of 
the wrongful arrest theory in their rulings on plaintiffs’ ADA claims 
for police misconduct, the idea behind the wrongful arrest theory—
that police officers violate the ADA when they arrest a disabled indi-
vidual because of actions that the individual was engaged in due to 
her disability—has been espoused by courts in a number of circuits.42
37 Jackson v. Inhabitants of Sanford, Civ. No. 94-12-P-H, 1994 WL 589617, at *1, 6 
(D. Me. Sept. 23, 1994). 
38 Id. at *1. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at *6.  Within a few days of the summary judgment ruling, the case settled for 
between $25,000 and $50,000.  Telephone Interview with Ronald D. Bourque, Bourque 
& Clegg, LLC, Attorney for Roland Jackson, in Sanford, Me. (May 18, 2005).  Under 
the terms of the settlement, the town had to review its policies and procedures to make 
sure that it did not discriminate against people with disabilities.  Brent Macey, Sanford 
Settles Suit Over Arrest of Disabled Man, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Sept. 30, 1994, at 1A.  
In addition, the town’s police officers had to receive “adequate training to enable 
them to distinguish between symptoms of disabilities and criminal activity.”  Id. 
42 See, e.g., Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing the 
wrongful arrest theory); Schorr I, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 237-38 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (noting 
the magistrate judge’s analysis of the application of the wrongful arrest theory to plain-
tiffs’ claim); McCray v. City of Dothan, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1276 (M.D. Ala. 2001) 
(noting the plaintiff’s attempted recovery under the wrongful arrest theory), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, No. 01-15756-DD, 2003 WL 23518420 (11th Cir. Apr. 24, 2003); An-
thony v. City of New York, No. 00 Civ. 4688(DLC), 2001 WL 741743, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 2, 2001) (discussing several cases involving the wrongful arrest theory). 
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B.  Reasonable Accommodation Theory 
While the wrongful arrest theory applies when an arrest results 
from an individual’s disability, the reasonable accommodation theory 
applies when there is a legitimate basis for the arrest, but in making 
that arrest the police officers do not take steps to reasonably accom-
modate the plaintiff’s disability.  Even though a number of courts have 
noted their preference for the wrongful arrest theory over the reason-
able accommodation theory, with some even stating that only claims 
under the former are viable,43 recent developments in Title II juris-
prudence44 have opened the door to plaintiffs’ arguments under the 
reasonable accommodation theory. 
In Rosen v. Montgomery County, plaintiff Jeffrey Rosen presented a 
Title II claim under the reasonable accommodation theory, contend-
ing that police officers made no attempt to accommodate his deafness 
when they took him into custody after his arrest for drunk driving.45  
According to Rosen, the officers did not attempt to communicate with 
him in writing and they “ignored his requests for an interpreter and 
for a TTY telephone so he could call a lawyer.”46  The court rejected 
Rosen’s ADA claims and affirmed the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment to the defendants based on a “lack of any discernible 
injury” that Rosen may have suffered.47  Even though its decision 
rested on the lack of injury, the court made clear its reservations 
about applying the ADA in such a situation.  Declaring that the “most 
obvious problem” with the plaintiff’s claim was “fitting an arrest into 
the ADA at all,”48 the court went on to limit the duties that police offi-
cers owe to suspects before arriving at the stationhouse:  “The police 
43 See, e.g., Patrice v. Murphy, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1159 (W.D. Wash. 1999) 
(“Where plaintiffs have argued that an arrest was a type of service, program or activity 
from which he has [sic] been excluded or denied the benefits, . . . there is no ADA 
claim . . . .  Where a plaintiff alleges that he was arrested because of his disability[,] . . . 
an ADA claim should lie.”); Gorman v. Bartch, 925 F. Supp. 653, 655 (W.D. Mo. 1996) 
(“[H]ad Plaintiff been arrested because he was handicapped, his arguments would 
more clearly satisfy the statutory requirements.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 152 F.3d 907 
(8th Cir. 1998). 
44 See infra Part II.B (presenting recent court decisions supporting the proposition 
that the ADA applies to law enforcement activity). 
45 121 F.3d 154, 156 (4th Cir. 1997). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 158.  The plaintiff had claimed that the injury that he suffered was hu-
miliation and embarrassment.  Id. at 157.  However, the court rejected this argument 
because “these are emotions experienced by almost every person stopped and arrested 
for drunk driving.”  Id. at 158. 
48 Id. at 157. 
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do not have to get an interpreter before they can stop and shackle a 
fleeing bank robber, and they do not have to do so to stop a suspected 
drunk driver, conduct a field sobriety test, and make an arrest.”49
Four years later, however, in McCray v. City of Dothan, a district 
court in Alabama allowed a deaf plaintiff’s ADA claim to go forward 
under the reasonable accommodation theory, based on the officers’ 
failure to provide an interpreter during the interrogation and after 
the arrest.50  The officers had been attempting to interrogate the 
plaintiff about a private property traffic accident.  When one of the 
officers refused to communicate by handwritten notes with the plain-
tiff, the incident escalated into a confrontation and the officers alleg-
edly assaulted the plaintiff and arrested him.51  The court held that 
under the circumstances, the police were “under an obligation under 
the ADA to accommodate in effecting arrest activities,”52 and that the 
appropriateness of the officers’ attempts at reasonable accommoda-
tion were disputed issues of material fact.53
Like the wrongful arrest theory, the reasonable accommodation 
theory has often guided the determinations of courts in principle even 
when the courts did not cite the theory by name.54  Even though it ap-
pears that these claims are less successful than claims under the 
wrongful arrest theory because of some courts’ reluctance to find such 
actions cognizable under the ADA,55 a number of courts throughout 
the country have sustained plaintiffs’ Title II claims on reasonable ac-
commodation grounds.56
49 Id. at 158. 
50 169 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1272-76 (M.D. Ala. 2001), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other 
grounds, No. 01-15756-DD, 2003 WL 23518420 (11th Cir. Apr. 24, 2003).  The district 
court also denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on wrongful arrest 
theory grounds.  Id. at 1276. 
51 Id. at 1269-70. 
52 Id. at 1275. 
53 Id. at 1276.  The parties in McCray ultimately agreed on a settlement in the 
amount of $575,000, the majority of which was for attorneys’ fees.  Telephone Inter-
view with the Office of Bobbie Crook, Esq., Attorney for Douglas McCray, in Dothan, 
Ala. (May 18, 2005). 
54 See cases cited supra note 27 (providing instances in which courts have described 
the wrongful arrest theory without articulating it by name). 
55 See cases cited supra note 43 (noting decisions that refused to recognize ADA 
claims based on the reasonable accommodation theory). 
56 See, e.g., Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 913 (8th Cir. 1998) (allowing the 
plaintiff’s claim that the officers failed to reasonably accommodate his disability when 
transporting him to the police station), rev’g 925 F. Supp. 653 (W.D. Mo. 1996); Schorr 
I, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 238-39 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (rejecting the magistrate judge’s con-
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C.  In Between the Two Theories 
Because the wrongful arrest theory and the reasonable accommo-
dation theory each apply only to a subset of possible Title II claims 
pertaining to police officers’ actions in effecting the arrest of a dis-
abled individual, it is not surprising that there are cases that do not fit 
neatly into either of the theories.  In Gohier v. Enright, a police officer 
was responding to reported disturbances when he saw the plaintiff’s 
decedent, Michael Lucero, walking down the street.57  Lucero did not 
match the description of the man for whom the officer was looking.58 
The police officer nevertheless got out of his car and approached 
Lucero, who suffered from schizophrenia, and a confrontation en-
sued, prompting the officer to draw his pistol.59  Lucero did not re-
spond to the officer’s order to show his hands and instead, while hold-
ing a “long, slender object that [the officer] thought was a knife,” 
advanced on the officer.60  When Lucero reached the officer’s car he 
“either stepped or lunged toward [the officer], making a stabbing mo-
tion with the object.”61  The officer shot him twice, killing him.62  The 
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
and held that the circumstances leading to Lucero’s death created an 
ADA claim that was “logically intermediate between the two arche-
types envisioned” by the wrongful arrest theory and the reasonable ac-
commodation theory.63  The officer was not using force on Lucero be-
cause the officer “misconceived the lawful effects of [Lucero’s] 
disability as criminal activity”; also, the officer did not “fail to accom-
modate Lucero’s disability while arresting him for ‘some crime unre-
lated to his disability.’”64  Rather, the court reasoned, the officer used 
force because Lucero’s conduct was not lawful. 
clusion that the reasonable accommodation theory did not apply to the plaintiffs’ ac-
tion). 
57 186 F.3d 1216, 1217 (10th Cir. 1999). 
58 Id.. 
59 Id. at 1217-18. 
60 Id. at 1218. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1221. 
64 Id. (quoting Patrice v. Murphy, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1159 (W.D. Wash. 1999)).  
Not all courts have read into the reasonable accommodation theory the requirement 
that the reason for the apprehension of the plaintiff (or the plaintiff’s decedent) must 
be unrelated to her disability.  See, e.g., Schorr I, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 233, 238-39 (M.D. 
Pa. 2003) (allowing an ADA claim to go forward based on the shooting death of plain-
tiffs’ decedent that occurred as police officers were trying to apprehend him after he 
escaped from a high security room at a hospital).  It is also important to note that the 
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Courts’ receptiveness to plaintiffs’ actions for police misconduct 
under Title II generally appears to be limited to claims under either 
the wrongful arrest theory or the reasonable accommodation theory.  
While judges have allowed a fair number of such claims to go for-
ward,65 Gohier suggests that plaintiffs who are arrested for engaging in 
illegal activity (such as assaulting a police officer) related to their dis-
ability may fall into a gap between the two theories.  As a result, these 
plaintiffs may be unable to state an ADA claim even if the officers did 
not reasonably accommodate the disability in effecting the arrest. 
II.  DISCARDING OLD ASSUMPTIONS: 
MAKING WAY FOR APPLICATION OF THE ADA TO ARRESTS 
Prior to 1998,66 cases interpreting the ADA usually rejected claims 
by plaintiffs who sought to apply Title II to police activities.67  Strictly 
construing the provisions of the statute, courts made several assump-
tions as to the intent of the ADA’s framers and the limited situations 
in which the provisions of Title II would apply:  (1) an arrestee or 
prisoner is not a “qualified individual” under the ADA because “[t]he 
terms ‘eligible’ and ‘participate’ imply voluntariness on the part of 
[the plaintiff];”68 (2) the phrase “benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities”69 does not apply to services, programs, or activities that are 
not traditionally thought of as “benefiting” an individual;70 and (3) 
Gohier court acknowledged that the plaintiff might have stated a valid Title II claim un-
der the reasonable accommodation theory if he had argued that Title II required the 
city to “better train its police officers to recognize reported disturbances that are likely 
to involve persons with mental disabilities, and to investigate and arrest such persons in 
a manner reasonably accommodating their disability.”  Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1222. 
65 See supra notes 42, 56 (citing cases in which courts have referred to the wrongful 
arrest theory or the reasonable accommodation theory). 
66 The year 1998 marked a turning point in courts’ acceptance of ADA claims re-
lating to law enforcement activities because of the Court’s decision in Pennsylvania De-
partment of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998).  See infra Part II.B (discussing the 
impact of the Yeskey decision). 
67 See infra Part II.A (discussing Gorman v. Bartch, 925 F. Supp. 653 (W.D. Mo. 
1996), and Rosen v. Montgomery County, 121 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 1997), two pre-1998 cases 
in which courts refused to apply Title II to police activities). 
68 Gorman, 925 F. Supp. at 656, aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 152 F.3d 
907 (8th Cir. 1998). 
69 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, 
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits 
of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
70 See Gorman, 925 F. Supp. at 656 (holding that criminal suspects who are being 
held against their will do not count as applicants who are seeking a benefit from the 
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the framers of the ADA did not intend for Title II to apply to arrestees 
and prisoners.71  Courts generally did not question these assumptions 
for the first eight years that the ADA was in effect.72  However, in the 
late 1990s, encouraged by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pennsyl-
vania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey,73 courts began to challenge, 
and eventually discard, all three of these assumptions. 
A.  Who Is a “Qualified Individual with a Disability”?: 
Old Assumptions About Title II 
The decision of the district court in Gorman v. Bartch illustrates the 
early limitations imposed on Title II application to police activities.  
Plaintiff Jeffrey Gorman was arrested outside a bar in Kansas City 
while he attempted to obtain assistance from two police officers after 
he had been asked to leave the bar.74  Gorman suffered from paraple-
gia resulting from a severe spinal cord injury and was confined to a 
wheelchair.75  However, the police van that the officers used to trans-
port Gorman to the station lacked the equipment necessary for carry-
ing a person in a wheelchair.76  As a result, the officers took Gorman 
out of his wheelchair, lifted him onto a bench within the van, and 
used his belt to tie him to the wall behind the bench.77  During the 
state); see also Rosen, 121 F.3d at 157 (“[C]alling a drunk driving arrest a ‘program or 
activity’ . . . strikes us as a stretch of the statutory language . . . .”). 
71 See Gorman, 925 F. Supp. at 655 (“The term ‘qualified individual’ was specifically 
defined by Congress to describe a person who meets eligibility requirements for 
the . . . participation in programs.  It strains the statute to talk about Plaintiff’s ‘eligibil-
ity’ to be arrested . . . or to ‘participate’ in being arrested . . . .”). 
72 See, e.g., Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1347 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that it 
was not clearly established that the ADA applied to prisoners); Gorman, 925 F. Supp. at 
658 (granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on arrestee’s ADA 
claims).  But see Jackson v. Inhabitants of Sanford, Civ. No. 94-12-P-H, 1994 WL 589617, 
at *6 (D. Me. Sept. 23, 1994) (concluding that the ADA “clearly appli[ed]” to the 
plaintiff’s claim for police misconduct). 
73 524 U.S. 206 (1998).  For a detailed discussion of Yeskey and its impact on Title 
II cases, see infra text accompanying notes 91-98. 
74 925 F. Supp. at 654.  The circuit court opinion provides additional detail as to 
the facts surrounding the incident.  Gorman became involved in a disagreement at a 
Kansas City bar called “Guitars and Cadillacs.”  Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 909 
(8th Cir. 1998).  Gorman started to descend the steps to the dance floor, and a bar 
employee told him that he could not go onto the dance floor.  Id.  When Gorman pro-
tested, the employee threw him out of the bar, and the employees at the door denied 
him readmission.  Id.  Gorman approached two police officers to solicit their help and 
ended up arguing with them.  Id.  They arrested him for trespassing.  Id. 
75 Gorman, 925 F. Supp. at 654. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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trip to the station, the belt broke and Gorman fell from the bench, 
suffering injuries to his back and shoulders.78  In addition, the fall 
broke Gorman’s urine bag, leaving him soaked in his own urine.79
Gorman filed an ADA claim against the police officer who drove 
the van, the police chief, and the police commissioners.80  He alleged 
that the police commissioners had failed 1) to provide a proper trans-
portation vehicle for individuals suffering from his disability, 2) to 
modify department policies and procedures dealing with arrest and 
transportation of such individuals, and 3) to establish proper training 
for police officers on how to handle disabled arrestees.81  Examining 
the language of Title II, the district court acknowledged that the Kan-
sas City Police Department constituted a public entity and that Gor-
man was disabled, but rejected the claim that the plaintiff was consid-
ered a “qualified individual with a disability,”82 as required by Title 
II.83  The court explained that the statute’s use of the term “eligibility” 
in the definition of a “qualified individual”84 prevented Title II from 
applying to arrestees:  “It strains the statute to talk about Plaintiff’s 
‘eligibility’ to be arrested and taken to jail or to ‘participate’ in being 
arrested . . . .”85  The court further noted that the words “‘eligible’ and 
‘participate’ imply voluntariness on the part of an applicant who seeks 
a benefit from the state,” and do not apply to criminal suspects “who 
are being held against their will.”86  The court therefore granted 
summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the ADA was not 
applicable to Gorman’s case.87
Other courts based their refusal to apply Title II to arrestees or 
prisoners on the language of the statute and the intent of its framers.  
The court in Rosen v. Montgomery County held that calling an arrest a 
78 Id. 
79 152 F.3d at 910.  The police officers had denied Gorman’s request to use the 
bathroom before the trip to the station.  Id. at 909. 
80 Id. at 910. 
81 Id.; 925 F. Supp. at 654-55. 
82 925 F. Supp. at 655. 
83 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by 
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits 
of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity . . . .”). 
84 See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000) (“The term ‘qualified individual with a disabil-
ity’ means an individual with a disability who . . . meets the essential eligibility re-
quirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities 
provided by a public entity.”). 
85 925 F. Supp. at 655. 
86 Id. at 656 (quoting Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1347 (4th Cir. 1995)). 
87 Id. 
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“program or activity” was “a stretch of the statutory language and of 
the underlying legislative intent.”88  The court noted that the plaintiff 
had not pointed to any language in the ADA that specifically brought 
arrests within its ambit.89  Even courts that acknowledged early on that 
prison activities could fall under Title II were hesitant about the idea 
of viewing an arrest itself as a “program or activity.”90
B.  Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey: 
A Broader Reading of Title II 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Department of Correc-
tions v. Yeskey91 firmly disposed of the assumptions that had prevented 
the lower courts from applying the ADA to police actions.  Though 
Yeskey dealt with ADA claims in the context of state prison programs,92 
the decision also served to question the foundations of the arguments 
against the application of Title II to arrests.  First addressing the ar-
gument that Yeskey was not a “qualified individual with a disability,” 
the Court pointed out that the definition in the statute included any-
one with a disability, without exceptions for prisoners or suspected 
criminals.93  Further, the Court rejected the Department of Correc-
tions’ argument that the words “eligibility” and “participation” im-
plied voluntariness on the part of the individual seeking the benefit 
from the government and therefore did not apply to prisoners who 
were being held against their will.94  Justice Scalia, writing for a 
unanimous Court, argued that this assumption was wrong for two rea-
88 121 F.3d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1997). 
89 Id. 
90 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that 
an educational program in a prison is considered a “program or activity” even though 
incarceration itself is not); Crawford v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 115 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 
1997) (“Incarceration itself is hardly a ‘program’ or ‘activity’ to which a disabled per-
son might wish access, but there is no doubt that an educational program is a program, 
and when it is provided by and in a state prison it is a program of a public entity.” (in-
ternal citation omitted)). 
91 524 U.S. 206 (1998).  Ronald Yeskey was a prisoner who was denied admission 
to a prison boot camp.  Id. at 208.  Yeskey was recommended for placement in a Moti-
vational Boot Camp for first-time offenders, which, if successfully completed, would 
have allowed him to receive early parole.  Id.  However, he was refused admission be-
cause of a medical history of hypertension.  Id. 
92 See id. at 213 (“[T]he ADA unambiguously extends to prison inmates.”). 
93 Id. at 210; see 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000) (defining a “qualified individual with 
a disability” as a person who, “with or without reasonable modifications to rules, poli-
cies, or practices . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of ser-
vices or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity”). 
94 524 U.S. at 211. 
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sons:  first, the words did not necessarily connote voluntariness, and 
second, even if the words did connote voluntariness, participation in 
prison activities such as the boot camp was voluntary.95  Although the 
second justification for the Court’s argument does not apply in the ar-
rest context, where participation is almost always involuntary, the 
Court’s unanimous declaration that the language of Title II did not 
require voluntariness destroyed a significant obstacle to plaintiffs’ 
ADA claims pertaining to arrests. 
The Yeskey Court also responded to the argument, which had fre-
quently appeared in response to both prison and arrest-related ADA 
claims, that the language of the ADA did not specifically mention 
prisoners or arrestees in its statement of findings and purpose.96  Stat-
ing that the contention that no reference to penal institutions ap-
peared in the ADA was “questionable” to begin with, the Court found 
that even if Congress did not envision that the ADA would apply to 
prisoners, “in the context of an unambiguous statutory text that is ir-
relevant.”97  The Court explained that “the fact that a statute can be 
‘applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress’” demon-
strates breadth rather than ambiguity.98
Lower courts soon followed the lead of the Yeskey Court in con-
struing the ADA to apply to police officers’ actions.  In Patrice v. Mur-
phy, the court found support in the legislative history of the ADA “for 
the proposition that, at least in some circumstances, an arrest may 
trigger the protections of the ADA.”99  The court cited a House Judici-
ary Committee report on the ADA: 
In order to comply with the non-discrimination mandate, it is often nec-
essary to provide training to public employees about disability.  For ex-
ample, persons who have epilepsy, and a variety of other disabilities, are 
frequently inappropriately arrested and jailed because police officers 
have not received proper training in the recognition of and aid [for] sei-
95 Id. 
96 Lower courts had, on occasion, already acknowledged the ADA’s applicability to 
claims against arresting police officers.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Inhabitants of Sanford, Civ. 
No. 94-12-P-H, 1994 WL 589617, at *6 (D. Me. Sept. 23, 1994) (“The legislative history 
of the ADA demonstrates that Congress was concerned with unjustified arrests of dis-
abled persons such as [plaintiff] alleges here.”). 
97 Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 211-12. 
98 Id. at 212 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)). 
99 43 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1159 (W.D. Wash. 1999). 
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zures.  Such discriminatory treatment based on disability can be avoided 
by proper training.
100
In addition, another court noted that the “broad language” of the 
ADA and the “absence of any stated exceptions” to its reach suggested 
that Title II could apply to areas involving law enforcement.101
Lower courts were also able to rely on the statutory analysis of the 
ADA that the Third Circuit elucidated in Yeskey, and which the Su-
preme Court affirmed.102  The court in Yeskey noted that Congress had 
instructed that Title II be interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
Rehabilitation Act,103 and the statutory definition of “program or activ-
ity” under the Rehabilitation Act “indicate[d] that the terms were in-
tended to be all-encompassing.”104  Additionally, the court emphasized 
the provision of the Rehabilitation Act that stated that “program or 
activity” was to include “‘all of the operations of . . . a department, 
agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or 
of a local government.’”105
The Third Circuit opinion in Yeskey also looked to the relevant 
Department of Justice regulations.106  The regulations defined 
“[b]enefit” as including the “provision of services, financial aid or dis-
position (i.e., treatment, handling, decision, sentencing, confinement, 
or other prescription of conduct).”107  In addition, the regulations as-
100 Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 50 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 473); see also 136 CONG. REC. E1913, 1916 (1990) (statement of Rep. 
Hoyer) (“[Title II] includes providing training to public employees in order to ensure 
that discriminatory actions do not occur.  For example, persons who have epilepsy are 
sometimes inappropriately arrested because police officers have not received proper 
training to recognize seizures and to respond to them.”); SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL 
RIGHTS:  DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 99 (2001) (“Police practices, specifically mentioned 
by Congress in its legislative history of ADA, are of particular concern to people with 
psychiatric disabilities, who are killed and injured by the police at an astonishing 
rate.”). 
101 Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000). 
102 Yeskey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 170-72 (3d Cir. 1997) (construing 
Section 504 and Title II broadly enough to apply to correctional facilities), aff’d, 524 
U.S. 206 (1998). 
103 For a discussion of the Rehabilitation Act, see infra Part III.C. 
104 Yeskey, 118 F.3d at 170. 
105 Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (1994)). 
106 28 C.F.R. § 35.190(b)(6) (2004); 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(j) (2004).  The regulations 
were promulgated in response to the express authorization by Congress in both the 
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2000), and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) 
(2000). 
107 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(j) (2004). 
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signed to the Department of Justice the responsibility of coordinating 
compliance with the ADA for “[a]ll programs, services, and regulatory 
activities relating to law enforcement, public safety, and the admini-
stration of justice, including courts and correctional institutions . . . 
[and] all other government functions not assigned to other desig-
nated agencies.”108  Such regulations provided strong support for the 
court’s position that the ADA applied to law enforcement activity. 
C.  An Open Road for Title II Plaintiffs? 
With the Supreme Court rejecting the traditional arguments 
against application of the ADA to law enforcement activities, and the 
lower courts beginning to accept a broad reading of Title II, the 
courthouse door appears to be open for disabled plaintiffs to bring 
ADA claims arising from police misconduct.  Of the courts that have 
recently ruled on such claims, district or appellate courts in five cir-
cuits have made favorable rulings.109  However, the path is not entirely 
clear for ADA plaintiffs.  Courts in several other circuits have rejected 
plaintiffs’ ADA claims for police misconduct110—but unlike courts in 
the pre-Yeskey Title II cases,111 these courts (with one exception)112 did 
108 28 C.F.R. § 35.190(b)(6) (2004). 
109 See Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2002) (uphold-
ing a jury verdict finding a violation of the ADA); Gorman v. Easley, 257 F.3d 738, 751 
(8th Cir. 2001) (affirming a jury verdict on plaintiff’s Title II claim), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom., Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 
250 F.3d 668, 691-92 (9th Cir. 2001) (broadly construing Title II and remanding the 
matter to the district court to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their ADA 
claim); Arnold v. City of York, 340 F. Supp. 2d 550, 554 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (denying de-
fendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ ADA claims); McCray v. City of Dothan, 169 F. 
Supp. 2d 1260, 1276 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (denying summary judgment to defendants on 
plaintiff’s ADA claim), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, No. 01-15756-DD, 2003 
WL 23518420 (11th Cir. Apr. 24, 2003). 
110 See Anthony v. City of New York, 339 F.3d 129, 141 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming a 
district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs’ ADA claim on 
the basis that there was no finding of intentional discrimination); Thompson v. Wil-
liamson County, 219 F.3d 555, 558 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiffs’ ADA claim 
that their son was denied medical services because of his disability failed as a matter of 
law because plaintiffs did not prove that decedent was denied access to a public service 
or that, if he was, the denial was because of his disability); Bates ex rel. Johns v. Chester-
field County, 216 F.3d 367, 373 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding no ADA violation because the 
use of force and arrest of plaintiff were not by reason of his disability); Sudac v. Hoang, 
378 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (D. Kan. 2005) (rejecting plaintiff’s ADA claim and finding 
that the alleged denial of benefits occurred because of decedent’s actions). 
111 See supra text accompanying notes 66-90 (discussing pre-Yeskey cases in which 
courts refused to apply Title II to police activities). 
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not reject plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds that Title II can never be 
applied in an arrest context.  This Part will provide a brief summary of 
how courts have treated disabled plaintiffs’ Title II actions for police 
misconduct post-Yeskey. 
In McCray v. City of Dothan, the court denied the defendants’ mo-
tion for summary judgment in a case brought by a deaf plaintiff who 
claimed that police officers had failed to accommodate his disability 
in arresting him.113  The court adopted the Fifth Circuit’s rule that 
“police activity is a government program under the ADA, but only 
when the circumstances surrounding the activity is [sic] ‘secure’ and 
there is ‘no threat to human safety.’”114  Not finding any evidence of a 
threat to human safety in the case at hand, the court concluded that 
summary judgment was inappropriate.115  Two years after the district 
court ruling, and six months after review by the Eleventh Circuit of 
plaintiffs’ non-ADA state and federal claims,116 the parties settled for 
$575,000.117
On review of a district court ruling on a claim under the ADA for 
injuries sustained while being transported in a police van that was not 
equipped with wheelchair restraints,118 the Eighth Circuit in Gorman v. 
Easley upheld a jury verdict of over two million dollars.119  The court 
quickly dismissed the defendants’ argument that Gorman was not a 
“qualified individual with a disability” and also denied two challenges 
by the police board to the jury instructions.120
112 Crocker v. Lewiston Police Dep’t, No. 00-13-PC, 2001 WL 114977, at *8-9 (D. 
Me. Feb. 9, 2001) (holding that an arrest is not the type of activity that a person could 
be “excluded from” under the ADA and granting defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment on plaintiff’s ADA claim). 
113 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.  For a summary of the facts of McCray, see supra text 
accompanying notes 50-53. 
114 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1275 (quoting Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 802 (5th 
Cir. 2000)). 
115 Id. at 1275-76. 
116 See McCray, 2003 WL 23518420, at *8 (affirming in part and reversing in part 
the district court’s ruling pertaining to plaintiff’s non-ADA state and federal claims). 
117 See supra note 53 (describing the settlement terms). 
118 For the facts of Gorman, see supra text accompanying notes 74-87. 
119 257 F.3d 738, 743 (8th Cir. 2001).  However, the court remanded to the district 
court for examination of the appropriateness of the damages.  Id. at 749.  The Su-
preme Court later reversed the Eighth Circuit and held that the punitive damages, 
which the jury had awarded Gorman in the amount of $1,200,000, were properly va-
cated by the district court.  Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002). 
120 Gorman, 257 F.3d at 750-51.  The jury instructions that the police board be-
lieved erroneous included the elements that plaintiff had to prove in order for liability 
to lie under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act:  “First, that the defendants failed to 
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Two recent Pennsylvania district court opinions also sided with 
plaintiffs who brought ADA claims for police misconduct, denying de-
fendants’ motions to dismiss.  In Schorr I, the court held that the scope 
of “services, programs, or activities” under the ADA was not limited to 
“commonly available and publicly shared accommodations such as 
parks, playgrounds, and transportation,” as a lay reader might believe, 
but in fact includes “the most basic of these functions . . . [namely] 
the lawful exercise of police powers, including the appropriate use of 
force by government officials acting under color of law.”121  The court 
further held that the Fifth Circuit’s rationale for rejecting ADA claims 
when the conduct occurred in the face of “exigent circumstances”122 
did not apply to the Schorrs’ claim because the Schorrs brought their 
claim not against the individual police officers, but against the police 
commission for failing to properly train the officers: 
The alleged non-compliance with the training requirements of the ADA 
did not occur the day that the officers shot Ryan Schorr; it occurred well 
before that day, when the Defendant policy makers failed to institute 
policies to accommodate disabled individuals such as Schorr by giving 
the officers the tools and resources to handle the situation peacefully.
123
The court therefore concluded that the Schorrs’ ADA claim could 
proceed against the police commission.124  After the district court’s 
ruling, the parties agreed on a settlement that included a confidential 
monetary payment as well as an agreement by the county and the po-
lice department to adopt procedures for dealing with mentally ill 
people, including the use of a mental health professional as a liai-
provide plaintiff appropriate transportation that reasonably accommodated his disabil-
ity after he was arrested, and [s]econd, that as a direct result of the defendants’ failure, 
plaintiff sustained damages.”  Id. at 750.  The district court had defined “reasonable 
accommodation” as “making modifications to the defendants’ practices for transport-
ing the plaintiff after he was arrested so that he would be transported in a manner that 
was safe and appropriate consistent with his disability.”  Id. 
121 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 235 (2003).  For a summary of the facts of Schorr I and 
Schorr II, see supra text accompanying notes 1-15. 
122 See Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801-02 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that offi-
cers have no duty to reasonably accommodate disabled suspects until the area is secure 
and there is no threat to human safety). 
123 Schorr I, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 238.  For a discussion of failure to train claims in 
general, see infra Part III.E. 
124 Id. at 239; accord Arnold v. City of York, No. Civ.A. 4:03-1352, 2004 WL 2331781, 
at *8-9 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2004) (applying the holding in Schorr I to the plaintiff’s 
claim of police misconduct under the ADA and denying the defendant city’s motion to 
dismiss), adopted by 340 F. Supp. 2d 550 (M.D. Pa. 2004). 
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son.125  The settlement also provided for police officer training in 
dealing with mentally ill individuals.126
Even more recently, in Hogan v. City of Easton, a court denied de-
fendants’ motion to dismiss an ADA claim brought by a man with a 
mental health disorder.127  Michael Hogan had been shot by police 
who were responding to Hogan’s wife’s 911 call to obtain help in 
calming him down after he experienced deterioration in his mental 
condition.128  Citing Schorr I, Yeskey, and the Eighth Circuit opinion in 
Gorman v. Bartch, the court held that Hogan stated a valid claim under 
the ADA “based on the failure of the City and County to properly train 
its police officers for encounters with disabled persons.”129  The Hogan 
case is now in the discovery phase, with a trial expected in January 
2006.130
Courts in other jurisdictions, however, have not been as willing to 
allow disabled plaintiffs’ ADA claims for police misconduct to go to a 
jury.  In Pannell v. City of Bellvue, police officers arrested John Pannell 
after a brief struggle that occurred when they attempted to enter his 
residence in response to a 911 call of domestic violence.131  Pannell, 
who was unable to communicate or move quickly due to a prior 
stroke, had not immediately responded to the officers’ demand that 
he drop the baseball bat he was holding and open the door for 
them.132  The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss 
the ADA claim, holding that there was “no showing that the officers 
intended to act as they did toward the plaintiff on the basis that he was 
disabled.”133
125 Telephone Interview with Gerald J. Williams, Williams, Cuker & Berezofsky, 
Attorney for Susan and Keith Schorr, in Phila., Pa. (May 26, 2005). 
126 Id. 
127 No. Civ.A. 04-759, 2004 WL 1836992, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2004). 
128 Id. at *1, 7.  When the police officers arrived at the Hogans’ residence, Mr. Ho-
gan had calmed down and was inside by himself.  Id. at *2.  The nine police officers 
who ultimately arrived at the scene did not ask Mrs. Hogan, who was outside the house, 
what her husband’s current condition was or whether she still needed help in calming 
him down.  Id.  They proceeded to initiate a standoff with Mr. Hogan that resulted in 
gunshot wounds to Mr. Hogan’s stomach, right hand, and left wrist.  Id. at *3-4. 
129 Id. at *7. 
130 Telephone Interview with Jordan B. Yeager, Boockvar & Yeager, Attorney for 
Michael Hogan, in Doylestown, Pa. (May 23, 2005). 
131 184 F. Supp. 2d 686, 687 (N.D. Ohio 2002). 
132 Id. at 687-88.  Pannell alleged that his family members shouted to the police 
officers who were at the door that Pannell was a stroke victim.  Id. 
133 Id. at 689.  It is interesting to note that there is no support for an intent re-
quirement for ADA actions in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Yeskey. 
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The following year, in Anthony v. City of New York, the Second Cir-
cuit reviewed the claim of a woman with Down Syndrome who alleged 
that ADA violations occurred in the course of police officers’ entry 
into her apartment, in response to a 911 call reporting a man with a 
knife, and the subsequent transportation of her to a mental hospital134  
The Second Circuit, like the district court in Pannell, read a discrimi-
natory intent requirement into Title II that did not appear in the leg-
islative history of, or case law interpreting, the ADA:  “There is no evi-
dence . . . that the seizure and hospitalization were motivated by 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.  Anthony has al-
leged no facts showing that Sergeant Mendez, who ordered Officers 
Collegio and Migliaro to seize Anthony, acted with discriminatory in-
tent.”135  The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment to defendants on the ADA claim.136
Overall, disabled plaintiffs who today bring claims under Title II 
for police officers’ actions in effecting an arrest will find a friendlier 
response by district and appellate courts than did plaintiffs pre-Yeskey.  
Although McCray and Pannell demonstrate that not all jurisdictions 
abide by the traditional Title II rule for proving a claim, most courts 
no longer reject the very notion of bringing an action under the ADA 
for police misconduct.  In a number of jurisdictions, such claims are 
allowed to go forward, and in some, large jury verdicts in the ensuing 
trials are upheld. 
III.  TITLE II VERSUS SECTION 1983:  ANOTHER BITE AT THE APPLE? 
Even if courts are willing to apply Title II to police actions, ques-
tions arise about the necessity and desirability of pursuing an ADA 
claim in such cases.  Actions under Section 1983 provide the usual 
civil remedy for police misconduct, and most cases that include an 
ADA claim resulting from an arrest also contain parallel Section 1983 
claims.137  As this Part will argue, the differences between ADA claims 
134 339 F.3d 129, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2003). 
135 Id. at 141. 
136 Id. 
137 See, e.g., Hogan v. City of Easton, No. Civ.A 04-759, 2004 WL 1836992, at *5-11 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2004) (ruling on plaintiffs’ cause of action under the ADA and six 
causes of action under Section 1983 that resulted from a confrontation between plain-
tiff and police officers); Schorr I, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 234-35 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (review-
ing plaintiffs’ claims under Section 1983 and the ADA pertaining to the killing of 
plaintiffs’ decedent by police officers); Lewis v. Truitt, 960 F. Supp. 175, 177 (S.D. Ind. 
1997) (“Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 [and] the Americans with Disabilities Act . . . .”). 
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and claims under Section 1983—in terms of elements, remedies, and 
various immunities—suggest that, even if disabled plaintiffs should 
not replace their Section 1983 claims with claims under Title II, they 
should still plead both claims.138  This Part will also explore the possi-
bility of pleading claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act,139 which is very similar to Title II in substance,140 but allows for 
greater flexibility in overcoming potential defenses.141
A.  Bars to Claims for Misconduct Under Section 1983: 
Jumping Through Hoops 
Claims under Section 1983 for police misconduct in effecting an 
arrest, particularly in cases where the plaintiff is disabled, are difficult 
to win.  In order to prove liability under the statute, “the plaintiff must 
prove that she has been deprived of a federal statutory or constitu-
tional right by someone acting ‘under color of’ state law.”142  Although 
138 See James C. Harrington, The ADA and Section 1983:  Walking Hand in Hand, 19 
REV. LITIG. 435, 445-63 (2000) (arguing that disabled plaintiffs should, for strategic 
litigation reasons, plead civil rights claims under the ADA in addition to Section 1983). 
139 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). 
140 See Katie Eyer, Note, Rehabilitation Act Redux, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 298 
(2005) (stating that the Rehabilitation Act and Title II “have been in most circum-
stances treated as identical by reviewing courts” because of statutory provisions requir-
ing their uniform interpretation). 
141 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 224-26 (noting that courts have held 
that states are not protected from suit under Section 504 by the Eleventh Amend-
ment). 
142 MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT:  LAW AND LITIGATION § 1:2, at 2 
(3d ed. 2004).  Although this Comment focuses on claims under Section 1983 pertain-
ing to constitutional violations, it is possible that a plaintiff could plead a Section 1983 
claim for violation of the ADA itself.  In order to state a valid claim for a statutory viola-
tion, a plaintiff must show that “Section 1983 creates an individually enforceable right 
in the class of beneficiaries to which he belongs.”  City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. 
Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453, 1458 (2005).  In addition, even though there is a rebuttable 
presumption that the right is enforceable, the defendant may defeat this presumption 
by showing that Congress did not intend the remedy for a newly created right.  Id.  Al-
though most courts have held that rights under Title II may be enforced in Section 
1983 actions, other courts have held that Title II cannot be enforced through such a 
suit because the ADA remedies are exclusive.  See 1 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES:  
PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 2:51 (2005) [hereinafter PRACTICE AND 
COMPLIANCE] (discussing the case law on the question of whether a plaintiff can plead 
a Section 1983 action for violation of Title II of the ADA).  Although the substantive 
law that a plaintiff would need to prove in order to succeed in a Section 1983 action 
based on a violation of the ADA would be different than the elements necessary to 
prove a Section 1983 action based on a constitutional violation, the immunities and 
damages would be regulated by the same rules as for any other 1983 action.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 150-69 (discussing immunity doctrines). 
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the elements that a plaintiff must prove vary depending on the type of 
claim and the type of governmental activity,143 the Supreme Court has 
held that Fourth Amendment standards apply to Section 1983 plain-
tiffs’ claims of excessive force when the use of force constitutes a “sei-
zure.”144  The plaintiff must therefore first show that the force exer-
cised against her represented a seizure.145  In addition, as Professor 
Michael Avery has argued, the “totality of the circumstances” doctrine 
that has been adopted by courts in such Fourth Amendment cases has 
proven “inadequate in deterring police misconduct and in providing 
remedies for mentally and emotionally disturbed [plaintiffs].”146  This 
test, as articulated in Graham v. Connor, provides that courts must bal-
ance the “nature and quality” of the Fourth Amendment intrusion 
against the “countervailing governmental interests at stake.”147  In 
judging the reasonableness of the police officers’ use of force—which 
must be examined from the perspective of a “reasonable officer on 
the scene”—courts look to the following three factors:  “the severity of 
the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to 
the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting 
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”148  In applying the “to-
tality of the circumstances test,” lower courts have given much weight 
143 AVERY, supra note 143, § 2:18, at 78.  Examples of common claims under Sec-
tion 1983 relating to police activities include excessive use of force, unlawful entry, 
failure to provide immediate medical attention, and unlawful search and seizure.  Id.  
The Supreme Court has held that there is no single standard for claims under Section 
1983 because the statute itself is not a source of substantive rights.  Id. (citing Graham 
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)). 
144 Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 394).  Because excessive use of force is the claim 
that most commonly appears in cases brought by disabled plaintiffs pertaining to po-
lice misconduct, this Comment will focus on that claim.  Claims of excessive force that 
do not constitute seizures (e.g., a claim against police officers resulting from a high-
speed chase of a suspect) are analyzed under substantive due process principles.  See 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-45 (1998) (stating that police action, 
such as engaging in a car chase, is properly examined under the Due Process Clause 
rather than the Fourth Amendment). 
145 AVERY ET AL., supra note 142, § 2:18, at 78 n.3 (citing Vathekan v. Prince 
George’s County, 154 F.3d 173, 178 (4th Cir. 1998)).  To prove that a “seizure” oc-
curred, the plaintiff must prove that government actors have, in some way, restrained 
her liberty by means of physical force or show of authority.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 
n.10 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)). 
146 Avery, supra note 10, at 267-68.  Avery’s article focuses on the claims of mentally 
and emotionally disturbed plaintiffs.  For a general discussion of the challenges of 
bringing a Section 1983 claim for police misconduct, see Thorne Clark, Comment, Pro-
tection from Protection:  Section 1983 and the ADA’s Implications for Devising a Race-Conscious 
Police Misconduct Statute, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1585, 1597-602 (2002). 
147 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
148 Id. 
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to the “emergency confronting the officer and the pressures that he 
may have experienced” and have not required that officers use the 
least intrusive means possible to handle such situations.149
Even if a plaintiff is able to prove excessive force under Section 
1983, she still might not succeed in her claim because the police offi-
cer could be entitled to qualified immunity.  The qualified immunity 
defense, which is applicable to claims of excessive force,150 provides 
police officers immunity from damages “unless a reasonable officer 
would have known that his actions would violate clearly established 
constitutional rights of the plaintiff.”151  As Professor James Harring-
ton has explained, the existence of the qualified immunity defense for 
police officers in Section 1983 claims “serves to make the civil rights 
plaintiff’s burden almost insurmountable.”152
The doctrine of municipal immunity also acts as an obstacle to a 
successful Section 1983 claim against local governments since the Su-
preme Court has held that there is no respondeat superior liability 
under the statute.153  Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, a 
plaintiff can state a claim against a local governing body for monetary, 
declaratory, or injunctive relief only if she can show that the injury she 
suffered was the result of the government’s policy or custom.154  In 
addition, in a Monell claim alleging that a municipality failed to ade-
quately train its police officers, the plaintiff must prove that “the fail-
ure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of per-
sons with whom the police come into contact.”155
149 Avery, supra note 10, at 273-74. 
150 See id. at 270 (“[I]n Saucier v. Katz, [533 U.S. 194, 197 (2001),] the [Supreme] 
Court held that a qualified immunity defense is available to claims of excessive force.”). 
151 AVERY ET AL., supra note 142, § 2:1, at 41.  As the authors of the treatise note, 
the scope of the protection of police officers’ actions under the qualified immunity 
defense has expanded over the past decade.  Id. 
152 Harrington, supra note 138, at 437-38.  “As a practical matter, officials almost 
always secure qualified immunity, either from the trial court or the appellate tribunal.  
Only the most flagrant and shocking conduct will defeat qualified immunity; merely 
‘stupid’ actions are insufficient.”  Id. at 438.  The low threshold required for a police 
officer to establish qualified immunity is exemplified in Brosseau v. Haugen, 125 S. Ct. 
596, 600 (2004) (per curiam), in which the Court held that it was not clearly estab-
lished that an officer violated the Fourth Amendment’s deadly force standards by 
shooting a suspect who was fleeing in a vehicle. 
153 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (“[A] municipality 
cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”). 
154 Id. at 690, 694. 
155 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).  For a discussion of courts’ 
treatment of failure to train claims against local governments and the importance of 
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While municipal immunity and qualified immunity protect the lo-
cal government and police officers who are sued in their individual 
capacity and, another immunity doctrine protects state government 
entities.  The Eleventh Amendment and the court-developed doctrine 
of sovereign immunity bar suits against state governments,156 prevent-
ing a plaintiff from obtaining under Section 1983 either legal or equi-
table relief directly against a state entity.157  However, under Ex parte 
Young,158a Section 1983 plaintiff can secure an equitable remedy, such 
as an injunction, by suing the state officials in their official capacity in-
stead of suing the state entity.159
An additional consideration that plaintiffs might have to contend 
with in bringing Section 1983 claims is the bar under Heck v. Humphrey 
against claims that challenge the validity of outstanding criminal 
judgments.160  In Heck, the Court held that a plaintiff who seeks to re-
cover damages for 
an unconstitutional conviction, imprisonment, or for other harm caused 
by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence in-
valid . . . must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed 
on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a 
police training with respect to encounters with mentally and emotionally disturbed 
people, see Avery, supra note 10, at 323-31. 
156 “Generally speaking, the state’s sovereign immunity extends to suits against 
state departments, arms, institutions, instrumentalities, agencies, counties, townships, 
as well as commissions or boards.”  57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State 
Tort Liability § 12 (2001) (internal citations omitted). 
157 The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens 
or Subjects of any Foreign State.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  Although the language of 
the Eleventh Amendment refers only to suits against a state by citizens of another state, 
the Supreme Court has “extended the Amendment’s applicability to suits by citizens 
against their own state.”  Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). 
158 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
159 See Mountain Cable Co. v. Pub. Serv. Bd., 242 F. Supp. 2d 400 (D. Vt. 2003) 
(“In its long-standing exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, Ex parte 
Young ‘permits federal courts to enjoin state officials to conform their conduct to re-
quirements of federal law . . . .’” (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289 (1977))).  
An equitable remedy against state officials will often be unsuccessful in cases of police 
misconduct, however, because of justiciability problems.  See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. 
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (holding that the plaintiff, who was subjected to a 
chokehold following a stop for a traffic violation, did not have standing to seek an in-
junction against the police department because it was impossible for the plaintiff to 
meet his burden of showing “irreparable injury”). 
160 512 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1994). 
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state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into 
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
161
 In Hainze v. Richards, in which plaintiff Kim Michael Hainze 
brought claims under both Section 1983 and the ADA, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that Hainze’s Section 1983 claims had properly been dis-
missed because he had been convicted of aggravated assault with a 
deadly weapon for the same set of events that were the subject of his 
police misconduct claim.162
Finally, the damages available in cases brought under Section 
1983 are often limited by law.  Successful plaintiffs are entitled to rea-
sonable compensatory damages,163 which are determined by the fact-
finder.164  Proof of intentional discrimination is not necessary to ob-
tain damages in a Section 1983 suit based on a Fourth Amendment 
violation.165  In addition, a plaintiff may be entitled to attorneys’ fees 
under Section 1988 at the discretion of the district court.166  Punitive 
damages are available only when “the defendant’s conduct is shown to 
be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when [the conduct] involves 
reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of 
161 Id. at 486-87 (internal citation omitted). 
162 207 F.3d 795, 797, 798-99 (5th Cir. 2000); cf. Hogan v. City of Easton, No. 
Civ.A. 04-759, 2004 WL 1836992, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2004) (noting, but rejecting, 
the defendants’ contention that the plaintiff’s excessive force claim was legally barred 
under Heck because the plaintiff had already pled guilty in state court to “one count of 
terroristic threats and nine counts of recklessly endangering another person”). 
163 See AVERY ET AL., supra note 142, § 13:2, at 598 (“The plaintiff is entitled to fair 
and reasonable compensation for the loss, harm, or injury suffered.”). 
164 Id. § 13:2, at 599 (“Setting the amount of compensatory damages is generally 
held to be within the discretion of the trier of fact . . . .”).  Though the damage award 
“is seldom reversed on appeal,” the authors of the treatise note that some courts have 
recently begun “to subject compensatory damage awards to greater scrutiny.”  Id. 
165 See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION:  PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 
in STEPHEN YAGMAN, POLICE MISCONDUCT AND CIVIL RIGHTS:  FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE 
AND INSTRUCTIONS § 10-21, at 682 (2d ed. 2002) (“It should be noted that § 1983 con-
tains no general requirement that the plaintiff prove the defendant acted with any par-
ticular state of mind.”).  Some predicate constitutional claims under Section 1983, 
such as First Amendment claims and Eighth Amendment claims, do require proof of a 
particular state of mind.  Id.  For a discussion of the intentional discrimination re-
quirement in Title II actions, see infra note 206 and accompanying text. 
166 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000); see AVERY ET AL., supra note 142, § 14:1, at 635 (“The 
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 provides that the prevailing party in 
actions brought under several civil rights statutes is entitled to attorneys’ fees . . . .” (in-
ternal citation omitted)).  Section 1988 was passed in response to a Supreme Court 
decision restricting punitive damages in Section 1983 claims to cases in which the de-
fendants acted in bad faith.  Id. § 14:1, at 636 (referencing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. 
Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)). 
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others,”167 and are never available in a Monell claim against a local gov-
ernment.168 
The substantive law that governs the elements necessary to prove a 
Section 1983 claim, immunities that protect the defendants, and limits 
on damages have made it exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to bring 
successful and worthwhile claims under this statute.169  In fact, as sev-
eral commentators have noted, the Supreme Court’s recent rulings 
have greatly restricted civil rights plaintiffs’ access to the courts and 
have frustrated the purpose of much of the civil rights legislation en-
acted over the past forty years.170  The next Part will explore the con-
tours of decisional law for Title II claims of police misconduct and the 
question of whether plaintiffs might fare better under the ADA than 
under Section 1983. 
B.  ADA Claims for Police Misconduct:  Avoiding the Hoops? 
The initial substantive elements that a plaintiff must prove under 
Title II of the ADA are entirely different from the elements necessary 
to prove a claim under Section 1983.  In a Title II claim, a plaintiff 
must prove 
(1) that [she] is a qualified individual with a disability;
171
 (2) that [she] 
was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some 
167 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). 
168 See Harrington, supra note 138, at 438-39 (noting that, for Monell claims, “only 
actual damages, and not punitive damages, are available”).  In addition, a plaintiff who 
could not prove actual damages, but could prove liability, could argue for nominal 
damages.  See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (“[T]he law recognizes the im-
portance to organized society that [certain] rights be scrupulously observed; but at the 
same time, it remains true to the principle that substantial damages should be awarded 
only to compensate actual injury . . . .”). 
169 Harrington has also articulated two other major obstacles for Section 1983 
plaintiffs.  See Harrington, supra note 138, at 439 (noting the interlocutory appeals sys-
tem that allows an official to save the expense of mounting a defense and the appellate 
courts’ “propensity to substitute [their] own interpretation of the facts for that of a 
judge or jury”). 
170 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 540 (“[T]here is a consistent and dis-
turbing theme to the Rehnquist Court’s decisions in recent years:  civil rights plaintiffs 
lose.”); David Rudovsky, Civil Rights Litigation:  The Current Paradox, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 487, 489 (2003) (“[D]espite the [current] explosion of litigation, with thousands of 
cases filed each year, an enormous increase in the number of lawyers, organizations, 
and services that are available to people who want to litigate these issues in court, we 
see a marked retrenchment in legal doctrine and access to the courts.”). 
171 Proving a disability under the ADA has become increasingly difficult in recent 
years.  See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195 (2002) (“Merely hav-
ing an impairment does not make one disabled for purposes of the ADA.”). 
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public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discrimi-
nated against by the public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of 
benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability.
172
In addition, a plaintiff must show that the police officers knew that the 
plaintiff was disabled.173  Some courts have also required that the dis-
crimination be intentional.174
A “totality of the circumstances” analysis does not necessarily apply 
to ADA claims—and countervailing governmental interests do not al-
ways come into play—because ADA claims do not implicate constitu-
tional principles.  However, while courts examining claims under the 
wrongful arrest theory175 are not likely to take into account counter-
vailing governmental interests, such interests often will come into play 
in the context of claims under the reasonable accommodation the-
ory.176  In Hainze v. Richards, for example, the court balanced the 
plaintiff’s rights under the ADA to be free from discrimination based 
on his disability against the interest in public safety and prevention of 
risks to the officers and bystanders:  “To require the officers to factor 
in whether their actions are going to comply with the ADA, in the 
presence of exigent circumstances and prior to securing the safety of 
themselves, other officers, and any nearby civilians, would pose an 
unnecessary risk to innocents.”177
With regard to claims that a government entity failed to train its 
police officers to recognize and appropriately handle individuals with 
disabilities, plaintiffs have faced fewer obstacles under Title II than 
they have under Section 1983.  Whereas City of Canton v. Harris re-
172 Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999). 
173 See Lewis v. Truitt, 960 F. Supp. 175, 178 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (holding that a plain-
tiff must show that the defendants knew or should have known that the plaintiff was 
disabled in order to recover under the ADA for police misconduct); accord Jackson v. 
Inhabitants of Sanford, Civ. No. 94-12-P-H, 1994 WL 589617, at *1, 6 (D. Me. Sept. 23, 
1994) (denying summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff’s ADA claim in part be-
cause plaintiff had told the police officer that he suffered a brain aneurysm that caused 
physical difficulties). 
174 See, e.g., Dillery v. City of Sandusky, 398 F.3d 562, 568 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that the plaintiff had not established a claim under the ADA resulting from police har-
assment when she was on the street in her wheelchair because she had not proven in-
tentional discrimination); see also supra text accompanying notes 131-37 (discussing 
cases in which courts required evidence of intentional discrimination to establish an 
ADA claim for police misconduct). 
175 See supra Part I.A (discussing the wrongful arrest theory). 
176 See supra Part I.B (discussing the reasonable accommodation theory). 
177 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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quired a showing of deliberate indifference for Section 1983 claims,178 
courts have not set a similar standard for succeeding on failure to 
train actions under Title II.179  In fact, in the few cases in which plain-
tiffs have pleaded both ADA and Section 1983 claims for failure to 
train, courts have been more receptive to the ADA action even though 
the substance of the failure to train argument was the same.  In Jackson 
v. Inhabitants of Sanford, for example, the court granted summary 
judgment to the town on the plaintiff’s failure to train claim under 
Section 1983 because “Jackson offer[ed] no evidence that Town of 
Sanford policymakers were, prior to Jackson’s arrest, deliberately in-
different to inadequate training policies likely to result in constitu-
tional violations.”180  However, on the plaintiff’s ADA claim that the 
town “failed to train its police officers to recognize symptoms of dis-
abilities and . . . to modify police policies, practices and procedures to 
prevent discriminatory treatment of the disabled,” the court denied 
summary judgment.181
The immunities available to defendants also differ under Title II.  
Since Title II claims must be brought against government entities,182 
not individual defendants, the qualified immunity defense usually 
does not apply.183  As the ADA Practice and Compliance Manual notes: 
178 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); see supra note 155 and accompanying text (noting a 
deliberate indifference requirement). 
179 However, it must be noted that even if a failure to train claim might be easier 
to prove under Title II than under Section 1983, a plaintiff may still have to prove in-
tentional discrimination in order to receive compensatory damages.  See infra note 206 
and accompanying text (discussing the standard for obtaining compensatory damages 
under Title II). 
180 Civ. No. 94-12-P-H, 1994 WL 589617, at *6 (D. Me. Sept. 23, 1994). 
181 Id.  But see Schorr I, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 234, 239 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (denying de-
fendants’ motion to dismiss on the failure to train claims under both the ADA and Sec-
tion 1983). 
182 Title II provides that no qualified individual with a disability shall be “excluded 
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities 
of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”  42 U.S.C. § 12132 
(2000) (emphasis added). 
183 See Harrington, supra note 138, at 442 (noting that “issues of qualified (good 
faith) immunity and municipal immunity do not arise” in ADA actions against gov-
ernment entities).  “The defense of qualified immunity is available to defendants only 
when they are sued in their individual capacities . . . .”  PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE, 
supra note 142, § 7:75.  Despite the seemingly clear language of Title II, there is some 
confusion among the courts as to whether ADA claims may be brought against defen-
dants in their individual capacity, and whether qualified immunity may apply.  Most 
courts recognize that the provisions of the ADA allow only for claims against govern-
ment entities.  See, e.g., EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (“[I]ndividuals who do not independently meet the ADA’s definition of 
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Whether qualified immunity is available at all in suits brought pursuant 
to ADA Title II is an open question since the defense is available only in 
individual capacity suits, but the recent trend is for courts to hold that 
individual capacity suits are not cognizable under Title II, which is di-
rected at public entities.
184
Similarly, municipal immunity is not an issue because the ADA claim 
itself is brought against a government entity, and therefore a Monell 
theory of respondeat superior is unnecessary.185
The question of sovereign immunity in Title II actions, however, is 
more complex.186  The Supreme Court has held that “Congress may 
abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both un-
equivocally intends to do so and ‘act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of 
constitutional authority.’”187  Because it is settled law that the language 
of the ADA evidences Congress’s intent to abrogate the states’ immu-
nity,188 the relevant question is whether Congress passed the ADA pur-
suant to a “valid grant of constitutional authority.”  The Supreme 
Court has held that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immu-
‘employer’ cannot be held liable under the ADA.”); Montez v. Romer, 32 F. Supp. 2d 
1235, 1241 (D. Colo. 1999) (“I conclude that the individual defendants in their indi-
vidual capacities are not properly subject to suit under the Rehabilitation Act or the 
Disability Act.”).  But see Niece v. Fitzner, 922 F. Supp. 1208, 1218-19 (E.D. Mich. 1996) 
(construing Title II to authorize suits against public actors in their individual capaci-
ties).  Some courts have ruled on defendants’ qualified immunity arguments without 
even discussing the issue of individual liability under the ADA.  See, e.g., Torcasio v. 
Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1342 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding, without reference to the individ-
ual liability dispute, that defendant officials of the Virginia Department of Corrections 
were protected by qualified immunity in a suit under the Rehabilitation Act and the 
ADA); Gorman v. Bishop, 919 F. Supp. 326, 331 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (granting defendant 
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds as to plaintiff’s claims against him 
in his individual capacity without discussing whether individuals are subject to ADA 
suits). 
184 PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 142, § 2:153 (internal citations omit-
ted). 
185 See Harrington, supra note 138, at 442 (noting that issues of municipal immu-
nity do not arise in ADA claims because those actions are brought against state and lo-
cal government entities themselves, not individuals). 
186 See id. (“The current question is the extent to which the ADA overcomes state 
sovereign immunity for 14th Amendment purposes.”). 
187 Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000)). 
188 See 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000) (“A State shall not be immune under the eleventh 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or 
State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter.”); Garrett, 531 U.S. 
at 363-64 (noting § 12202 and stating that the question of whether Congress had in-
tended to abrogate the states’ immunity was not in dispute). 
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nity through the exercise of its Article I commerce power,189 but it can 
abrogate that immunity through its powers under Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.190
In the past four years, the Supreme Court has begun to examine 
the nature of Congress’s source of authority in enacting the ADA in 
order to determine whether Congress has validly abrogated the states’ 
sovereign immunity under the statute.  In Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 
the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars the recovery of 
monetary damages under Title I of the ADA191 in private law suits by 
state employees against the state.192  However, the Court explicitly de-
clined to rule on the question of whether Title II actions against the 
state for monetary damages were similarly restricted.193
In Tennessee v. Lane, the Supreme Court examined the question of 
whether Title II of the ADA fell within Congress’s enforcement power 
under the Fourteenth Amendment such that the statute validly abro-
gated the states’ sovereign immunity.194  George Lane and Beverly 
Jones, the respondents in the case, were paraplegics who used wheel-
chairs and claimed that they were denied access to the state courts.195  
The Court’s holding was limited by the nature of the respondents’ 
claim:  “[W]e conclude that Title II, as it applies to the class of cases impli-
189 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (“The Eleventh 
Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used 
to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.”).  Article 
I of the Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
190 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364 (“Congress may subject nonconsenting States to suit 
in federal court when it does so pursuant to a valid exercise of its § 5 power.”).  Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “Congress shall have power to en-
force, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of” the Fourteenth Amendment.  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
191 Title I of the ADA provides that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against 
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in re-
gard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employ-
ees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges 
of employment.”  42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000). 
192 531 U.S. at 360.  The Court noted that its ruling did not prevent private plain-
tiffs from obtaining injunctive relief against state officials under Title I, nor prevent 
enforcement of Title I standards by the United States in actions for monetary damages.  
Id. at 374 n.9. 
193 See id. at 360 n.1 (“We are not disposed to decide the constitutional issue 
whether Title II . . . is appropriate legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment . . . .”). 
194 541 U.S. 509, 513 (2004). 
195 Id. at 513-14. 
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cating the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid exer-
cise of Congress’ § 5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment.”196  Although a strong argument certainly could 
be made for extending Lane to a Title II claim pertaining to police 
misconduct,197 the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the question.198  
Even if states were immune from monetary judgments under Title II, 
however, cases stemming from police officers’ actions brought against 
local police departments or the board of police commissioners would 
not be subject to state sovereign immunity,199 and actions for injunc-
tive relief under Ex parte Young200 would be available.201
The Heck v. Humphrey bar against Section 1983 claims that chal-
lenge the validity of outstanding court judgments202 may or may not be 
196 Id. at 533-34 (emphasis added). 
197 The Lane Court’s analysis of whether Congress had the power under Section 
Five to enact Title II of the ADA relied heavily on the basic constitutional guarantees 
that Congress sought to remedy under the Act.  Id. at 522-23.  These guarantees were 
“subject to more searching judicial review” than discrimination based on a disability, 
which is subject only to rational basis review.  Id.  The Court referred to the right of 
access to courts, which was specifically at issue in Lane, as a right that is “protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 523.  The rights 
claimed by disabled plaintiffs seeking to sue state governments for harm caused during 
an arrest similarly implicate the Due Process Clause.  In addition, the Lane Court’s dis-
cussion of the harm that Title II was designed to address cited a “pattern of unequal 
treatment in the administration of a wide range of public services, programs, and ac-
tivities, including the penal system, public education, and voting.”  Id. at 525 (emphasis 
added) (internal citations omitted). 
198 The Court has, however, granted certiorari in a case pertaining to a closely-
related question:  whether states are protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
from suits by disabled prisoners under the ADA.  Goodman v. Georgia, 125 S. Ct. 2266 
(2005); see Linda Greenhouse, Justices To Decide if Disabled Inmates May Sue States for Dam-
ages, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at A14 (reporting on the Supreme Court’s grant of cer-
tiorari in the case to determine whether state prison inmates may sue the state for dis-
crimination under the ADA).  The Court’s decision in this case will likely shed light on 
the question of whether states are protected by sovereign immunity from suits by ar-
restees under Title II. 
199 See Gorman v. Easley, 257 F.3d 738, 743-44 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
board of police commissioners was not an “arm of the state” for the purposes of quali-
fying for Eleventh Amendment immunity), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Barnes v. 
Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002).  For a list of the entities that are generally considered 
protected from suits for damages under principles of sovereign immunity, see supra 
note 156. 
200 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
201 However, similar to Section 1983 actions under Ex parte Young, it is likely that 
the justiciability doctrine would bar most attempts to bring an action under Ex parte 
Young for police misconduct.  For additional discussion of the Ex parte Young doctrine, 
see supra note 159. 
202 512 U.S. 477, 488-90 (1994).  For a discussion of Heck, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 160-63. 
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a bar to parallel ADA claims.  The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on 
the question of whether Heck pertains to ADA actions, and lower 
courts are not in consensus on whether to apply Heck in ADA cases.203  
However, a strong argument can be made that Heck does not bar Title 
II claims.  Heck itself applied only to actions under Section 1983.204  
Further, the reasons for the Heck bar—to prevent plaintiffs from 
bringing Section 1983 claims as a backdoor way of challenging their 
convictions—would not serve the intended purpose in many Title II 
claims pertaining to police misconduct, particularly those brought 
under the reasonable accommodation theory.  In such a case, a plain-
tiff would be arguing that the defendants had failed to properly train 
the arresting officers to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s dis-
ability.  Logically, therefore, the plaintiff’s argument would not neces-
sarily call into question the appropriateness of his arrest or sen-
tence.205
Compensatory damages may be available under Title II of the 
ADA, but intentional discrimination must be shown.206  Punitive dam-
ages may not be awarded.207  In Barnes v. Gorman, the Supreme Court 
determined that just as punitive damages could not be obtained in 
suits under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, they also could not 
be obtained in claims under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act because the ADA incorporates the “remedies, 
procedures, and rights” of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Rehabilita-
tion Act in turn incorporates the “remedies, procedures, and rights” 
203 See Browdy v. Karpe, No. 3:00 CV 1866(CFD), 2004 WL 2203464, at *8 (D. 
Conn. Sept. 20, 2004) (“Although the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not 
yet considered whether the holding in Heck applies to ADA claims, [the court is per-
suaded] that the reasoning set forth in Heck to preclude section 1983 actions[] applies 
equally to ADA claims.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  But see Miller v. Ghee, 22 
F. App’x 388, 390 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding the district court’s dismissal of the ADA 
claim, not for Heck reasons as the district court did, but because of sovereign immu-
nity). 
204 512 U.S. at 486-87. 
205 It must be noted, though, that a failure to train claim that does not call into 
question the appropriateness of a plaintiff’s arrest or sentence would not be barred by 
Heck under Section 1983. 
206 See Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 126 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[P]rivate 
individuals may recover compensatory damages under § 504 and Title II only for inten-
tional discrimination.” (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280-81 (2001))); 
PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 142, § 2:168 (stating that compensatory dam-
ages are available under Title II upon a showing of an intentional violation). 
207 See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (holding that plaintiffs cannot 
receive punitive damages in suits under Title II or Section 504). 
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of the Civil Rights Act.208  Injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and at-
torneys’ fees may be awarded under Title II.209
C.  The Rehabilitation Act:  Filling in the Gap? 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which provides substantially 
the same protections as Title II210 but applies only to public entities 
that receive “[f]ederal financial assistance,”211 is a basis for disability 
discrimination claims that the legal community often overlooks.212  As 
Katie Eyer has noted, despite widespread concerns about courts’ treat-
ment of the ADA in regard to immunity defenses, “most of the legal 
scholarship that has addressed . . . legal protections for individuals 
208 Id. at 184-85.  The Court analyzed the question of whether punitive damages 
are available under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act as follows:  prior decisions had held 
that there was an implied private right of action under Title VI, and that the traditional 
presumption in favor of any appropriate relief for violation of a federal right applied; 
however, Title VI invokes Congress’s power under the Spending Clause, which means 
that principles of contract law are relevant in an analysis of the appropriate relief; be-
cause a specific remedy is appropriate relief under this theory only if the recipient of 
federal funding is “on notice” that it is subjecting itself to liability of that nature, and 
because the remedy of punitive damages is neither expressly or impliedly included in 
Title VI, such damages are not appropriate under Title VI.  Id. at 185-89. 
209 PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 142, §§ 2:164, 2:167, 2:169.  According 
to Harrington, it is important to note that the ADA allows a “potentially broad recovery 
of a successful attorney’s out-of-pocket expenses as well as attorney’s fees and costs.”  
Harrington, supra note 138, at 461. 
210 Katie Eyer writes of Title II and Section 504: 
There are . . . a number of provisions that require some form of consistent in-
terpretation of the two Acts, even in the government programs and services 
area.  Most notably, Title II provides (and has provided since its enactment) 
that except for certain exceptions mandated by statute, all regulations prom-
ulgated pursuant to Title II, “shall be consistent with the coordination regula-
tions” of the Rehabilitation Act.  Given that Title II as enacted included, like § 
504, only a very minimal core anti-discrimination provision (which itself is vir-
tually identical to § 504), this requirement of consistent regulations has had 
the effect of compelling consistent treatment of the Acts in most circum-
stances.  Furthermore, all interpretations of Title II are, like Title I, also sub-
ject to Title V’s requirement that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided [by statute], 
nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the 
standards applied under . . . the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . .” 
Eyer, supra note 140, at 298 (internal citations omitted) (brackets in original). 
211 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). 
212 See Eyer, supra note 140, at 271-72 (noting the “relatively skimpy treatment of 
the Rehabilitation Act’s protections” in legal scholarship).  Disability rights attorney 
Stephen Gold similarly notes that the Rehabilitation Act is often neglected by plaintiffs 
despite its advantages over the ADA in terms of immunity defenses.  Telephone Inter-
view with Stephen Gold, Esq., in Phila., Pa. (Feb. 14, 2005). 
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with disabilities has discussed the ADA’s predecessor, § 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act, in only a cursory fashion, if at all.”213
Section 504 provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with 
a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be ex-
cluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity.”214  In regard 
to claims of police misconduct, Title II is “similar in substance to the 
Rehabilitation Act, and cases interpreting either are applicable and 
interchangeable.”215  In addition, the ADA provides that the “reme-
dies, procedures, and rights” of the Rehabilitation Act “shall be the 
remedies procedures, and rights” provided to plaintiffs under the 
ADA.216
The substantial similarity and interrelatedness between Section 
504 and Title II suggests that the elements, potential defenses, and 
damages available for a claim under Section 504 would parallel the 
elements, potential defenses, and damages available under Title II,217 
and that courts willing to apply Title II to claims of police miscon-
duct218 would similarly be willing to apply Section 504 to those claims.  
Indeed, some courts examining actions in which plaintiffs have 
pleaded claims under both Section 504 and Title II have not distin-
guished between the two claims in their opinions.219
The one major difference between Title II and Section 504—the 
federal funding requirement attached to Section 504—has two impor-
tant implications for claims of police misconduct, one that constricts 
213 Eyer, supra note 140, at 271.  For an interesting analysis of how the passage of 
the ADA affected the protection of rights under the Rehabilitation Act, see Ruth 
Colker, The Death of Section 504, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 219 (2002). 
214 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). 
215 Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  There are minor differences between the provisions and interpretation of 
Title II and Section 504; however, an analysis of these differences is beyond the scope 
of this Comment.  For a comprehensive comparison of Title II and Section 504, see 
Eyer, supra note 140, at 298-309. 
216 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2000). 
217 See supra Part III.B (discussing possible damages for police misconduct under 
the ADA). 
218 See supra Part II.C (recognizing Title II’s application to claims of police mis-
conduct). 
219 See, e.g., Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799-803 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that 
the language of Title II “generally tracks” the language of Section 504, labeling a sec-
tion of the opinion “ADA/Section 504 claims,” and analyzing both claims under Title II 
standards); Schorr I, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 235 n.1, 235-39 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (stating that 
Title II is intended to be interpreted “in a manner consistent with” Section 504 and 
analyzing the plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims under the same standard). 
    
192 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 157 
 
the potential scope of Rehabilitation Act actions and one that expands 
it.  Only public entities that receive federal funding may be sued un-
der Section 504.  However, as Eyer has pointed out, while this limita-
tion is a substantial one for plaintiffs who sue private actors, it has only 
a minor effect in the area of “state-perpetrated discrimination,” be-
cause (1) if a state entity receives any of its funding from the federal 
government, it is subject to liability under Section 504 for all of its 
programs or activities;220 and (2) “a very substantial proportion of state 
budget dollars are allocated to state entities that are also recipients of 
federal funding.”221  In fact, in recent years very few actions against 
state actors under the Rehabilitation Act have been dismissed because 
the defendant did not receive federal funds.222
Therefore, while the limitation created by the federal funding re-
quirement of the Rehabilitation Act does not appear to create a major 
obstacle for plaintiffs claiming police misconduct, the advantages that 
the funding requirement provides have the potential to set it apart 
significantly from Title II.  States are not immune under the Eleventh 
Amendment from federal suits under Section 504 because when Con-
gress amended the Rehabilitation Act in 1986223 it “unambiguously 
condition[ed] the receipt of federal funds on a waiver of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity to claims under section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act,”224 and state agencies waive their immunity by “continuing to 
accept federal funds.”225  Therefore, if plaintiffs are unable to success-
fully sue state government entities under Title II because of the state’s 
sovereign immunity, a parallel claim under Section 504 would succeed 
where the ADA claim failed. 
D.  Pleading Complementary Claims 
As the analysis of the case law surrounding Section 1983, ADA, 
and Rehabilitation Act claims suggests, plaintiffs bringing any of these 
220 Eyer, supra note 140, at 282-83. 
221 Id. at 286. 
222 Id. at 286-87 (“Between the years 1988 and 2004, there have been only nine 
cases in which Rehabilitation Act claims against state entities were dismissed for lack of 
federal funding.” (internal citation omitted)). 
223 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2000) (“A State shall not be immune under the Elev-
enth Amendment . . . for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act . . . or the 
provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Fed-
eral financial assistance.”). 
224 Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 344 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th 
Cir. 2003). 
225 Id. 
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actions face a number of obstacles and limitations.  A Section 1983 
plaintiff may have difficulty proving a Fourth Amendment violation 
given the “totality of the circumstances” test, may not be able to make 
a Monell showing necessary to establish the police department’s mu-
nicipal liability, or may lose on the basis of a Heck bar against recovery.  
A Title II plaintiff may fail to prove her claim because she is unable to 
prove that she has a disability under the ADA, as defined by the 
courts; or she may succeed in proving her claim, but then find that 
she is entitled only to nominal damages because she has not proven 
intent to discriminate.  A Section 504 plaintiff may find her claim 
dismissed because the state governmental entity that she is suing does 
not receive federal funds. 
Although, as Part III.B suggests, there are benefits to pleading a 
police misconduct claim under the ADA,226 there are also areas in 
which a plaintiff would fare better under Section 1983 than under Ti-
tle II.  Under the ADA, plaintiffs cannot receive punitive damages and 
must show intentional discrimination to receive even compensatory 
damages.227  A Section 1983 claim predicated on the Fourth Amend-
ment, on the other hand, allows for reasonable compensatory dam-
ages without a showing of intentional discrimination,228 and for puni-
tive damages where a plaintiff can show either defendants’ malicious 
intent or callous indifference to federally protected rights229—a show-
ing that might not be much more difficult than the showing of inten-
tional discrimination necessary to recover compensatory damages un-
der the ADA.230
226 See supra Part III.B (describing how an ADA claim differs from a Section 1983 
claim—in terms of elements, immunities, and the Heck bar—in ways that may make it 
easier for a plaintiff to succeed with an ADA claim). 
227 See supra text accompanying notes 206-08 (discussing damages available under 
Title II). 
228 See supra note 165 (stating that claims under Section 1983 generally do not re-
quire a showing of intent). 
229 See supra text accompanying notes 167-69 (discussing the standard for obtain-
ing punitive damages under Section 1983). 
230 See supra text accompanying note 206 (noting the standard for obtaining com-
pensatory damages under the ADA).  In the case of a failure to train claim against a 
municipality, there is an additional requirement under Section 1983 that complicates 
the issue of damages:  the plaintiff must prove that the failure to train constitutes a pol-
icy or custom that amounts to “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with 
whom the police come into contact.”  City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 
(1989).  For compensatory damages, therefore, the damages analysis for a failure to 
train claim depends on whether it is more difficult for a plaintiff to prove deliberate 
indifference under Section 1983 or intentional discrimination under Title II.  In fact, 
some courts have conflated the two standards, reading the deliberate indifference re-
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Because of the complementary nature of Section 1983, Title II, 
and Section 504, it would be beneficial for a disabled plaintiff to plead 
all three claims in an action for police misconduct.231  Therefore, 
James Harrington’s recommendation that plaintiffs use creative 
lawyering in bringing civil rights claims,232 and Stephen Gold’s sugges-
tion that plaintiffs use Rehabilitation Act claims to “piggy-back” on Ti-
tle II claims,233 appear to be wise advice.  Harrington writes that plain-
tiffs should “first plead the ADA Title II action against the government 
entity involved,” and then “plead a § 1983 action, carefully and in 
great factual detail, against an individual and municipality to attempt 
to overcome potential immunity issues.”234
Because the case law on ADA and Rehabilitation Act immunities is 
far less developed than the Section 1983 case law, pleading a Title II 
claim also provides a plaintiff with greater potential to convince the 
court that the substantive law in the area—as well as the law on im-
munities and damages—falls in her favor.  For example, under Tennes-
see v. Lane,235 a plaintiff could make a strong argument that a state en-
tity is liable for damages in a Title II action for police misconduct, 
quirement into the Title II compensatory damages analysis.  See, e.g., Lovell v. Chan-
dler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the Section 1983 “deliberate in-
difference” standard set forth in City of Canton was the appropriate standard for deter-
mining whether a plaintiff had proven the requisite level of intent that entitled her to 
compensatory damages under Title II).  However, it is likely that the failure to train 
standard under Section 1983 will still be more difficult for a plaintiff to meet than the 
intentional discrimination standard under Title II because courts have found that the 
City of Canton requirement of a policy or custom of deliberate indifference is unnecessary 
to prove Title II intentional discrimination.  See Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 
F.3d 567, 575 (5th Cir. 2002) (agreeing with the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Rosen v. 
Montgomery County, 121 F.3d 154, 157 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997), that a “policy of discrimina-
tion” does not need to be identified by a Title II plaintiff in order to bring a successful 
claim for compensatory damages). 
231 There is no procedural bar to pleading all three of these claims together.  Al-
though some courts have rejected claims under Section 1983 based on a violation of 
the ADA under the theory that the ADA is the exclusive remedy for such violations, see 
PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 142, § 2:51 (discussing courts’ rejection of Sec-
tion 1983 actions for violations of Title II), this theory does not defeat Section 1983 
claims for constitutional violations that are based on the same facts as parallel ADA or 
Rehabilitation Act claims.  See id. (“The inability to enforce the ADA under § 1983 does 
not preclude a § 1983 suit for due process violations arising out of the same nucleus of 
operative facts.”). 
232 See Harrington, supra note 138, at 463-64 (advocating “creativity of counsel” in 
using the ADA to “fill the void left by § 1983 decisional law”). 
233 Telephone Interview with Stephen Gold, Esq., supra note 212 (advocating the 
use of Rehabilitation Act claims in conjunction with ADA claims). 
234 Harrington, supra note 138, at 464. 
235 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
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because Congress had abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity in such cases.  However, a plaintiff would be un-
able to argue that states can be sued for monetary damages under Sec-
tion 1983, since case law in that area is settled.236
E.  Going Beyond Section 1983: 
Responding to Particularized Discrimination 
In addition to the benefits that a claim under the ADA or the Re-
habilitation Act creates in terms of the decisional law on immunities 
and damages, such a claim also provides disabled plaintiffs with a 
unique advantage:  in terms of the substance of the pleadings, the 
governing law, and the possible remedy, the claim will be framed to 
respond to the particularized discrimination in question— discrimina-
tion based on disability. 
Claims that police departments and local governments have failed 
to appropriately train officers are prime examples of the importance 
of particularized ADA claims.  Plaintiffs suing under the ADA can ar-
gue not only that the policymaking defendants failed to train officers 
in the appropriate use of force and in avoiding discriminatory behav-
ior, but specifically that the defendants failed to train their officers in 
how to treat people with disabilities and how to respond to situations 
involving disabled citizens so as to prevent situations from escalating 
and resulting in injury or death. 
In Hogan v. City of Easton, for example, plaintiff Michael Hogan’s 
ADA claim alleged that the city and the county failed to properly train 
their police officers for “peaceful encounters with disabled persons,” 
and that such failure resulted in discrimination against him.237  In his 
complaint, Hogan asserted that (1) upon the police officers’ arrival at 
his residence in response to a 911 call from his wife, his family mem-
bers advised the police that Hogan suffered from anxiety, panic disor-
ders, and depression, and that he should be approached in a calm 
and quiet manner; (2) the officers refused to use peaceful mecha-
nisms to resolve the standoff that developed and “instead isolated Mr. 
Hogan from his private sources of aid;” (3) the officers further esca-
lated the situation by activating the city’s SWAT team; and (4) as a re-
sult of the police officers’ action, Hogan felt “trapped and severely 
236 See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1979) (holding that Section 1983 
does not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity). 
237 No. Civ.A. 04-759, 2004 WL 1836992, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2004).  For a dis-
cussion of Hogan, see supra text accompanying notes 127-31. 
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fearful of the Police Officers” and “increasingly despondent about the 
situation.”238  In the ensuing confrontation, the officers shot Hogan in 
the hand, wrist, and stomach.239  Even if Hogan were unable to suc-
ceed in a traditional action for excessive use of force or failure to train 
under Section 1983240—because of the officers’ potential defense that 
at the time of the confrontation they reasonably believed that Hogan 
had a gun on him and would shoot them241—Hogan’s ADA claim for 
failure to train could focus on the officers’ actions prior to the con-
frontation. 
For plaintiffs who have already proven their claims in court—or 
who have proven enough to convince the defendants to settle—the 
difference between the potential remedy resulting from an ADA claim 
and one resulting from a Section 1983 claim may also be an important 
consideration.  Jackson v. Inhabitants of Sanford 242 illustrates the benefits 
of ADA claims in this context.  After a federal district judge in Maine 
granted summary judgment to Roland Jackson on his ADA claim that 
the town of Sanford failed to properly train its police officers to rec-
ognize symptoms of disabilities, and failed to modify its police poli-
cies, practices, and procedures to prevent discriminatory treatment of 
the disabled,243 the town of Sanford agreed to settle the case.244  Not 
only did Jackson receive monetary damages in the “five-figure” range, 
he also obtained an important concession from the town:  under the 
settlement, the town agreed to comply with the ADA as interpreted by 
238 Id. at *2-3. 
239 Id. at *4. 
240 However, the egregious nature of the officers’ actions might allow Hogan to 
succeed on his Section 1983 excessive use of force and failure to train claims.  See, e.g., 
id. at *4 (“Officer Mazzeo came over to Mr. Hogan, who was laying on the floor bleed-
ing, and stepped on his wrist, making an audible crunch, which caused Mr. Hogan to 
pass out momentarily.”).  In fact, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss 
these claims, id. at *12, which, as of the writing of this Comment, are still pending.  
However, in cases in which the officers acted appropriately at the time of the confron-
tation, but inappropriately during the time leading up to the confrontation, a failure 
to train claim under the ADA would be necessary. 
241 According to the complaint, Hogan “disarmed his weapon and pulled the bolt 
back and the lever down in an attempt to demonstrate that it was unloaded and could 
not be fired.”  Id. at *4.  The court found that the officers “opened fire on him” as he 
bent down to surrender the shotgun.  Id.  Hogan did have a shotgun prior to the con-
frontation with the officers, but he placed it on the ground before ascending the 
basement steps to the landing where the officers were standing.  Id. 
242 Civ. No. 94-12-P-H, 1994 WL 589617 (D. Me. Sept. 23, 1994).  For the details of 
Jackson, see supra notes 37-41. 
243 Id. at *6. 
244 See Macey, supra note 41, at 1A (discussing the settlement terms in the Jackson 
case). 
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the district judge in the summary judgment ruling.245  The town had 
to ensure that police officers received adequate training in distin-
guishing between symptoms of disabilities and criminal activity, and 
had to ensure that its policies and procedures did not discriminate 
against people with disabilities.246
Although the law pertaining to failure to train claims under the 
ADA is fairly undeveloped, courts in cases such as Jackson have been 
receptive to such claims.247  As these cases demonstrate, failure to train 
claims epitomize the advantages of pleading actions under the ADA:  
first by helping a disabled plaintiff to prove the claim, and then by 
enabling her to procure an appropriate remedy.  By molding a claim 
to fit the particularized rights violation, a plaintiff may increase the 
likelihood that she will succeed in her claim and receive a remedy that 
responds most appropriately to the violation.248  Pleading a claim to fit 
the rights violation in question more closely also brings important ad-
ditional benefits.  By pushing courts to develop more detailed stan-
dards for determining questions of law pertaining to the interaction 
between disabled persons and law enforcement officials, plaintiffs will 
encourage the creation of a body of disability-rights law that courts 
may apply even in non-ADA contexts.  In addition, more frequent 
ADA claims for police misconduct may bring about modifications to 
policies and practices, which will help focus and strengthen the stan-
dards for such policies and practices in the context of Section 1983 
claims. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has argued that for police misconduct cases, there 
is a strategic incentive for a disabled plaintiff to bring claims under 
the ADA in addition to the traditional claims under Section 1983.  
Part II described how courts since Yeskey have generally been willing to 
allow plaintiffs to plead Title II claims related to law enforcement ac-
tivities.  The assumptions that had previously resulted in frequent 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 See supra text accompanying notes 178-82 (discussing courts’ treatment of fail-
ure to train claims under the ADA). 
248 See supra text accompanying notes 237-47 (citing Hogan and Jackson as examples 
of how pleading an ADA claim, rather than a Section 1983 claim, can benefit a plaintiff 
both by increasing her likelihood of success and by paving the way for a remedy that 
responds to the specific violation because ADA actions focus on the defendants’ spe-
cific conduct that discriminated based on disability). 
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dismissal of such claims—that ADA’s language and intent precluded 
prisoners or arrestees from falling under Title II’s prohibition on de-
nial of the “benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity”249—were discarded by the Supreme Court in Yeskey and no 
longer serve as justification for a blanket rule excluding such plaintiffs 
from the reach of Title II.250
The difficulties inherent in Section 1983 actions for police mis-
conduct, explored in Part III, heighten the necessity for disabled 
plaintiffs to plead parallel Title II and Section 504 claims.  Although 
the road is certainly not free of comparable obstacles for such claims, 
and the monetary damages that are available under Title II may be 
limited, such actions complement Section 1983 actions by requiring 
different elements and generally falling subject to fewer claims of im-
munity by defendants.  
However, beyond the practical and strategic justifications for 
pleading parallel ADA claims in police misconduct cases, as Part III.E 
suggested, lies a more compelling reason for disabled plaintiffs to in-
clude such claims.  The ADA was intended to provide a mandate to 
eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities,251 but it is 
not entirely self-implementing legislation.  Even though Title II di-
rects the Attorney General to promulgate regulations to ensure that 
public entities do not discriminate against people with disabilities,252 
many forms of discrimination against the disabled go unnoticed and 
unchanged.  As Susan Stefan has written of discrimination based on 
disability, “[t]he more deeply structural, embedded, and nondiscrete 
the discrimination is, the less it is recognizable or remediable as dis-
crimination.”253
Discrimination against disabled individuals during arrests is a par-
ticularly structural and embedded form of discrimination, and it often 
249 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). 
250 As Part II acknowledged, however, not all courts are receptive to ADA actions 
arising from police misconduct, and the absence of a Supreme Court opinion approv-
ing and defining such actions has resulted in the occasional articulation of unjustifia-
bly high standards for plaintiffs to prove a Title II claim based on police officers’ ac-
tions in effecting an arrest.  See, e.g., Pannell v. City of Bellvue, 184 F. Supp. 2d 686, 689 
(N.D. Ohio 2002) (requiring a showing “that the officers intended to act as they did 
toward the plaintiff on the basis that he was disabled”). 
251 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2000) (including among the state purposes of the 
ADA the provision of “a clear and comprehensive national mandate for elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities”). 
252 See 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (2000) (“[T]he Attorney General shall promulgate regu-
lations . . . that implement [Title II].”). 
253 STEFAN, supra note 100, at 24. 
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goes unrecognized.  An officer who is taught to use force when con-
fronted with what she perceives as a threat may apply that knowledge 
when responding to a mentally or physically disabled person, not real-
izing that by treating this person the same way that she treats others, 
she may in fact be failing to reasonably accommodate his disability, 
and thereby discriminate against him.254  Section 1983 actions, 
whether or not they result in a successful judgment for a plaintiff, will 
not by themselves send a sufficient message to police departments and 
state and local governments that they must change their practices to 
accommodate people with disabilities and provide training for their 
officers in how to respond to the needs of the disabled.  Actions under 
the ADA will send precisely such a message. 
 
254 Cf. Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference:  ADA Accommodations 
as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 579-80 (2004) (refuting the view that ADA-
mandated accommodations result in “something more than equality for the disabled” 
because “disability-related accommodations must operate as antidiscrimination provi-
sions . . . in order to alter social attitudes towards the disabled”). 
